Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 3

Article 4

Summer 6-1-2013

The Odd State of Twiqbal Plausibility in Pleading Affirmative
Defenses
William M. Janssen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
William M. Janssen, The Odd State of Twiqbal Plausibility in Pleading Affirmative Defenses , 70
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1573 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol70/iss3/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Odd State of Twiqbal Plausibility
in Pleading Affirmative Defenses
William M. Janssen*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................... 1574
II. The Challenge of the National Incoherence on
Twiqbal’s Applicability to Affirmative Defenses .......... 1578
III. A Litigation Exemplar: Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp. ....... 1585
A. Mr. Weddle’s Case and Its Pleadings...................... 1586
B. The Weddle Court’s Ruling...................................... 1591
C. The Weddle Court’s Rationale ................................. 1598
IV. A Survey of the Case Law Ruling on
Twiqbal’s Applicability to Affirmative Defenses .......... 1602
A. The Majority Trend Rejects Twiqbal for Defenses,
but the Minority View Remains Substantial .......... 1604
B. The Textual Argument Debate ............................... 1611
C. The Policy Argument Debate .................................. 1617
V. National Incoherence and the Practitioner’s
Dilemma......................................................................... 1622
VI. Conclusion...................................................................... 1634
VII. Appendix of Cases to The Odd State of Twiqbal
Plausibility in Pleading Affirmative Defenses .............. 1635
* William M. Janssen. Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law,
Charleston, South Carolina. An earlier version of this Article appeared as a
chapter in TOP 20 FOOD AND DRUG CASES, 2012 & CASES TO WATCH, 2013 (FDLI
2013). The author thanks John B. Reiss, Michael Levin-Epstein, and the Food
and Drug Law Institute for that opportunity. The author also thanks Madeline
J. Trilling (juris doctor 2014, Charleston School of Law) for her extraordinary
research and good “charting” humor that proved so indispensable to the drafting
of this piece, and both Margaret P. Chamberlain and Bryan P. Smith (both juris
doctor 2015, Charleston School of Law) for their wonderful supplemental
research assistance.

1573

1574

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1573 (2013)
I. Introduction

The phrase, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander,” is familiar not just to Parisian-trained restaurant chefs.
Along with its American cousin,1 the phrase has long found a
settled home in the English lexicon as a shorthand way of
imparting a principle of general equality—it is, to the idiom
scholar and daily conversationalist alike, “something that you say
to suggest that if a particular type of behaviour is acceptable for
one person, it should also be acceptable for another person.”2 It
seems that the phrase’s culinary heritage comes from the
supposedly evident notion that the sauce one would serve with a
dish of cooked female goose is no different than the one expected
to be served with a dish of cooked male goose.3 Given this fowl
ancestry, the phrase, unsurprisingly, was once understood as
connoting equality just between sexes.4 It has long since acquired
1. “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.” See CAMBRIDGE
IDIOMS DICTIONARY 167 (2d ed. 2006) (identifying “good for” substitution
(replacing “sauce for”) as an “American & Australian old-fashioned” recasting of
the earlier British saying).
2. See id. (offering the illustrative usage example: “If your husband can go
out with his friends, then surely you can go out with yours. What’s sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander.”).
3. See Answer to What Does the Saying ‘What Is Sauce for the Goose Is
Sauce for the Gander’ Mean?, ANSWERS BLOG, http://wiki.answers.com/
Q/What_does_the_saying_‘What_is_sauce_for_the_goose_is_sauce_for_the_gand
er’_mean?feedback=1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“This saying comes from
cooking - you don’t make sauce for the male goose and sauce for the female - you
make one sauce.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). If this
discussion has whetted your appetite for goose, the Thomas Jefferson
Foundation offers you a recipe for a colonial sauce. Leni the Cook, Jefferson-Era
(Nov.
4,
2011),
Recipe:
Sauce
for
a
Goose,
MONTICELLO
http://www.monticello.org/site/blog-and-community/posts/jefferson-era-recipe-sa
uce-goose (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. A “goose” is “any of various long-necked, web-footed, wild or domestic
waterfowl that are like ducks but larger, especially, a female . . . [as]
distinguished from a gander.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 787 (2d ed. 1983). A “gander,” conversely, is “a male goose.” Id. at
752. Evidently, the British iteration of the saying finds its origins in John Ray’s
1670 publication Catalogue of Proverbs, where he, parenthetically, characterized
it as “a woman’s proverb.” See STUART FLEXNER & DORIS FLEXNER, WISE WORDS
AND WIVES’ TALES: THE ORIGINS, MEANINGS AND TIME-HONORED WISDOM OF
PROVERBS AND FOLK SAYINGS OLDE AND NEW 159 (1993) (“That that’s good sawce
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its contemporary, far broader application—anything that’s fair
for you, ought to be fair for me.5
Though old fashioned, the phrase has made something of a
modern revival of late in the fascinatingly tumultuous world of
post-“Twiqbal”6 federal pleading practice. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Twiqbal announced that federal claimants may not
plead in a cursory, conclusory fashion, but must instead supply
enough facts in their pleadings to “‘nudge[] [their] claims’ . . .
‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”7 This whole
business of “plausibility” has left courts and scholars in quite a
state of anxiety.8 And it has created a fair measure of uncertainty
for the goose, is good for a gander.” (quoting JOHN RAY, CATALOGUE OF PROVERBS
98 (1670)); see also E.D. HIRSCH, JR., JOSEPH F. KETT & JAMES TREFIL, NEW
DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 57 (3d ed. 2002) (defining the saying as
follows: “What is good for a man is equally good for a woman; or what a man can
have or do, so can a woman have or do”). Some contend the saying actually may
have even earlier roots, traced back to John Heywood’s A Dialogue Conteinyng
the Nomber in Effect of All the Prouerbes in the Englishe Tongue (“As well for
the coowe as for the bull”), though it was given wide circulation in Roger
L’Estrange’s 1692 translation of Fables of Aesop (“Sauce for a Goose is Sauce for
a Gander”). See FLEXNER & FLEXNER, supra at 159 (discussing the origins of the
phrase).
5. See MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS AND PHRASAL VERBS
750 (Richard A. Spears ed. 2005) (explaining the saying to mean: “What is good
for one person is good for another”). Elsewhere, the phrase’s definition has been
explained by illustration. For an example of such an illustration, see Ken
Greenwald, What’s Sauce for the Goose, WORDWIZARD (Dec. 13, 2004, 8:25 AM),
http://www.wordwizard.com/phpbb3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=23699 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Greenwald
defines the phrase to mean the following:
What is appropriate for one person is equally appropriate for another
person in a similar situation; sometimes used in the context of sexual
equality: If smoking is banned on the factory floor then it should also
be banned in the boardroom—what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander.
6. “Twiqbal” has become the clever, handy abbreviation to refer
collectively to the U.S. Supreme Court’s two recent federal pleading decisions in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009). See, e.g., RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d
723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (identifying “Twiqbal” as how the Supreme Court’s
Iqbal and Twombly decisions are now “commonly known”).
7. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
8. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting in part) (“Iqbal’s reliance on the fact/conclusion
dichotomy is highly subjective, and returns courts to the long disapproved
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for plaintiffs struggling to decode the right way to plead
“plausibly.”9
But the pleading stage does not end with the claim. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe that defending parties
must counterplead, with their answer, to the claim’s
accusations.10 In doing so, must a defending party’s answer
confront this brave new world of “plausibility” pleading? Should
defending parties have to “nudge” their defenses across the line
into “plausibility” in the same way that claimants must nudge
their complaints? Isn’t that the fair and just thing to require?
After all, in the words of several of the federal district judges who
have weighed in on this issue already, isn’t “what is sauce for the
goose sauce for the gander”?11
methods of analysis under the regime of code pleading.”); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel
& Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Exactly how implausible is
‘implausible’ remains to be seen.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
23–26 (2010) (decrying the “plausible” standard’s instruction that courts rely on
“judicial experience and common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective
concepts largely devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning”).
9. See, e.g., PAUL BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.06 (2013)
(discussing the Court’s “important, but unclear,” Twombly opinion, and
surmising how a civil RICO complaint might survive the “plausibility” inquiry);
MICHAEL DORE, LAW OF TOXIC TORTS § 10:1 (2012) (“While courts will
undoubtedly reach a variety of conclusions with respect to whether toxic tort
complaints meet the Iqbal plausibility standard, it is clear that the basis for
resolving this question will be very different than it has been in the past.”);
DANA SHILLING, LAWYER’S DESK BOOK § 18.01 (2012) (“The plaintiff’s bar says
that Iqbal demands specificity that is often impossible until after discovery.”); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460 (2008)
(suggesting the Supreme Court “has seemingly turned its back on the liberal
ethos of the rules and moved towards a more restrictive ethos,” which is thought
unfortunate because “the application of plausibility pleading is likely to stymie
many valid claims in addition to the groundless claims that will not survive”).
But cf. DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK, & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 8.2 (2012) (noting that because “astute
practitioners” have for years pleaded complaints with more than just their bare
bones, “for most claims Twombly/Iqbal does not effect a serious or substantial
change in pleading practice”).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)–(c) (outlining the requirements for admissions,
denials, and affirmative defenses).
11. See, e.g., Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 285 F.R.D. 255,
258 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (using the phrase “what’s good for the goose is good for the
gander”); Bank of Beaver City v. Southwest Feeders LLC, No. 4:10CV3209, 2011
WL 4632887, at *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 4, 2011) (same); Lopez v. Asmar’s
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This question has not been squarely addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Twombly,12 Iqbal,13 or any subsequent Court
opinion. Nor has it yet been directly confronted by any U.S. court
of appeals. Rather, this interpretative job has remained, to date,
only the labor of the federal district courts, and they have written
on the question aplenty. Their work is an intriguing story,
complete with a curious minority-to-majority trending-line twist
at the end. But their work is also a tale of disuniformity. And in
that lack of uniformity, much mischief lurks.
Part II of this Article illustrates the incoherence of the
national courts on the issue of Twiqbal’s applicability to the
pleading of affirmative defenses, and explains why this
incoherence poses worrisome risks in federal civil litigation.14
Part III selects an exemplar case decision as a vehicle for
examining this issue. That case, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp.,15
Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *1 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (same); Racick v. Dominion, 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C.
2010); Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., Civ. No. 09–10239–RGS, 2009 WL
2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (same).
12. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
13. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
14. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the pleading of
both general and affirmative defenses, this Article explores the Twiqbal
pleading question only as it respects the latter. General defense pleading is
addressed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(1)(A), which provides that
responding parties must “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each
claim asserted against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). General defenses, however,
are not especially prone to a Twiqbal pleading controversy for several reasons.
First, general defenses confine the pleader to just three expressions—admitting
the allegation, denying it, or announcing a lack of knowledge or information to
either admit or deny. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B), 8(b)(5) (setting forth general
pleading requirements). That protocol does not lend itself to much of a factual
pleading debate. Second, by explicit leave of the Rules, denials may be made
generally (and, thus, conclusorily). See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(3) (allowing general
denials). Third, post-Twombly authority confirms that such denials require no
special pleader magic. See In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2008) (“No
prescribed set of words need be employed in framing the general denial; any
statement making it clear that the defendant intends to put in issue all of the
averments in the opposing party’s pleading is sufficient.” (quoting 5 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1265,
546–47 (3d ed. 2004)). In light of this explicit tolerance for conclusory,
nonfactual defensive pleading, the inapplicability of Twiqbal to general defenses
seems incontestable.
15. No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
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tackled the question in the context of a misappropriated likeness
controversy filed by a professional football player against the
maker of Alka-Seltzer. The opinion’s result and reasoning aligns
with the growing majority of courts that have considered the
issue, and offers a worthy guide for considering the issue in an
actual litigation context. Part IV surveys the various opinions of
the federal judiciary on the question, describing their respective
approaches and the principal analyses that lead them to their
conclusions. Part V examines the three litigation options
available to those who must plead affirmative defenses, and
concludes that none is safe, reliable, or certain.
II. The Challenge of the National Incoherence on Twiqbal’s
Applicability to Affirmative Defenses
Few examples crystallize the incoherence of the nation’s
treatment of Twiqbal and affirmative defenses quite as well as
the remarkable tale of J & J Sports Productions, Inc. (J & J). This
company hails from Campbell, California (about an hour south of
San Francisco) and is in the business of sublicensing closedcircuit television exhibitions of boxing telecasts.16 Apparently, J &
J acquires exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights
for certain boxing matches and then sublicenses with various
commercial establishments (including restaurants and bars) for
the public exhibition of the match telecasts.17 Over the course of
one seventeen-month period (July 2008–December 2009), J & J
controlled the distribution rights for four such closed-circuit
telecasted matches: “‘The Battle’: Miguel Cotto v. Antonio

16. See About Us, J & J SPORTS PRODS., INC., http://www.boxingseries.com/
about_us.php#1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (noting that the company has
acquired rights to boxing broadcasts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
17. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT,
2012 WL 2919681, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012) (noting these rights); J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz, No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011 WL 2881285,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011) (same); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No.
CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 794826, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011)
(same).
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Margarito” (July 26, 2008);18 “‘The Dream Match’: Oscar De La
Hoya v. Manny Pacquiao” (December 8, 2008);19 “‘Number One’:
The Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Juan Manuel Marquez
Championship Fight Program” (September 19, 2009);20 and
“‘Firepower’: Manny Pacquiao v. Miguel Cotto” (November 14,
2009).21
Soon after these telecasts, J & J filed ten federal lawsuits in,
respectively, the District of Arizona, the Eastern, Northern, and
Southern Districts of California, and the Southern District of
Indiana.22 The accusations in all ten lawsuits were essentially the
same—J & J accused various restaurants, bars, and other
business establishments with unlawfully intercepting the four
boxing telecasts.23 Federal law proscribes such interceptions, and
provides those injured with a right to recover compensatory and
enhanced damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.24 The
18. “The Battle” Litigation: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, No.
CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX, 2011 WL 720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011).
19. “The Dream Match” Litigations: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Luhn, No.
2:10–CV–03229 JAM–CKD, 2011 WL 5040709 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011); Munoz,
2011 WL 2881285; J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB,
2011 WL 2132723 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
20. “Number One” Litigations: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gidha, No. CIV
S–10–2509 KJM–KJN,
2012 WL 537494 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012); Franco, 2011 WL 794826; J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Coyne, No. C 10–04206 CRB, 2011 WL 227670 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Montanez, No. 1:10–cv–01693–AWI–
SKO, 2010 WL 5279907 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010).
21. “Firepower” Litigations: Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681; J & J Sports Prods.,
Inc. v. Mendoza-Govan, No. C 10–05123 WHA, 2011 WL 1544886 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 2011).
22. See supra notes 17–21 (outlining the J & J lawsuits).
23. Supra notes 17–21. In one of J & J’s other federal suits, the trial judge
catalogued the various ways in which such unlawful interceptions might take
place: (1) use of a device that “descrambles the reception of a pay-per-view
broadcast when installed on a cable TV line;” (2) use of a card that “descrambles
the reception of a pay-per-view broadcast when installed on a DSS satellite;”
(3) use of a misrepresented purchase by which a commercial establishment
underpays for the programming by declaring itself to qualify for a residential
rate; (4) use of a cable splice or cable drop; and (5) acquiring “other illegal
unencryption devices” or “illegal satellite authorization codes.” J & J Sports
Prods., Inc. v. Patton, Civ. No. 10–40241–FDS, 2011 WL 5075828, at *4 n.3 (D.
Mass. Oct. 25, 2011).
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the penalties for “[u]nauthorized
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defendants in each case filed answers to the complaints,
including affirmative defenses.25 In response, J & J filed motions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike each
affirmative defense as insufficient, contending (among other
things) that the pleaded defenses failed to meet the “plausibility”
standard established by Twiqbal.26
In the two Arizona opinions, two different district judges
refused J & J’s request to apply Twiqbal, reasoning that, absent
instructions otherwise from the Supreme Court or the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Twiqbal standard does not
apply to affirmative defenses—the Spartan nature of defendants’
pleading notwithstanding.27 All the defenses survived.
In two of the California cases, a district judge from the
Northern District and a district judge from the Eastern District
granted J & J’s request to apply Twiqbal, reasoning that
affirmative defenses are indeed governed by the “plausibility”
pleading standard.28 Both courts struck all of the respective
defendants’ affirmative defenses (twenty-one defenses stricken in
the Northern District case, twenty-nine defenses stricken in the
Eastern District case), ruling that, as pleaded, the affirmative

reception of cable service”).
25. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT, 2012
WL 2919681, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012)”); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz,
No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011 WL 2881285, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011);
J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No. CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL
794826, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian,
No. CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX, 2011 WL 720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011).
26. Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681, at *2 n.1”); Munoz, 2011 WL 2881285, at *1;
Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2; Khachatrian, 2011 WL 720049, at *1 n.1. See
also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense . . . .”).
27. See Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681, at *2 n.1 (Teiborg, J.) (“[T]he Court is
hesitant to apply the Twombly standard to test the sufficiency of Defendant’s
pleading of his affirmative defenses.”); Khachatrian, 2011 WL 720049, at *1 n.1
(Snow, J.) (“Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should apply the Twombly
standard to Defendants’ affirmative defense is misplaced.”).
28. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mendoza-Govan, No. C 10–05123 WHA,
2011 WL 1544886 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) (Alsup, J.) (“Twombly’s
heightened pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses . . . .”); Franco,
2011 WL 794826, at *2 (O’Neill, J.) (applying the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses).
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defenses were “boilerplate” that lacked “supporting facts.”29 As
one of the judges admonished, such a pleading approach fell well
short of the standard Twiqbal imposed: “To state an affirmative
defense sufficiently, a defendant must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”30 Consequently, the
affirmative defenses, as austerely pleaded, “amount to ‘blanket
assertions’ of legal theories” that “fail to provide [J & J] with fair
notice as to the facts upon which the defenses are asserted.”31
In the Indiana opinion, the district judge rejected J & J’s
request to apply Twiqbal, but held that affirmative defenses may
be stricken nonetheless if they are “insufficient on the face of the
pleadings.”32 The court then explained that some of the sparsely
pleaded affirmative defenses were sufficient and some were not,
and entered a ruling granting in part and denying in part the
motion to strike.33
In the five remaining cases, all from California districts, five
different district judges ruled that they did not have to decide
whether Twiqbal applied to affirmative defenses or not. Instead,
by applying an arguably more forgiving “fair notice” standard,
two of the judges (one from the Eastern District and one from the
Southern District) found that cursory allegations imparted proper
notice to the plaintiff,34 although three other, different judges
(two from the Eastern District and one from the Northern
District) found that cursory allegations did not give proper notice
to the plaintiff.35
29. See Mendoza-Govan, 2011 WL 1544886, at *1–8 (“[D]efendant does not
supply any supporting facts . . . .”); Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2–4 (“[A]
boilerplate defense . . . [not] supported by facts.”).
30. Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554).
31. Id.
32. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz, No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011
WL 2881285, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011) (Lawrence, J.).
33. See id. (allowing some affirmative defenses but striking others).
34. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Luhn, No. 2:10–CV–03229 JAM–CKD,
2011 WL 5040709, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (Hayes, J.) (finding that
plaintiff had sufficient notice of defendant’s defenses); J & J Sports Prods., Inc.
v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 2132723, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. May
27, 2011) (Mendez, J.) (same).
35. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gidha, No. CIV S–10–2509 KJM–KJN,
2012 WL 537494, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012) (Mueller, J.) (“This court also
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One litigant. Ten written opinions, by ten different federal
judges sitting in three different states. The same essential motion
filed ten times under the identical Federal Rule. Five different
outcomes, supported by five differing views of Twiqbal’s
applicability to affirmative defenses. If you were J & J Sports
Productions, Inc., or its counsel, it’d probably be tough to know
whether you were telecasting boxing matches, or enduring one.
The danger with this national incoherence is made clear by
simply considering the nature of affirmative defenses.
Not all defenses are affirmative ones, but the list of
affirmative defenses testifies to their potentially case-dispositive
importance. They include: assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, estoppel, fraud, laches, release, res judicata, statute
of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver.36 These are not
inconsequential legal arguments; if any of these defenses exist,
they could terminate portions (or the entirety) of a claimant’s
lawsuit.37 They may well prove to be, therefore, critical legal
positions in a litigation.
Yet, affirmative defenses are vulnerable to loss at the
pleading stage. Indeed, even delaying the assertion of an
affirmative defense carries formidable risks. The Federal Rules
obligate defending parties to “affirmatively” assert such defenses
in their responsive pleadings.38 Unasserted affirmative defenses
declines to reach the issue of whether the heightened pleading standard applies
to defendants’ answer because, as set forth below, the challenged affirmative
defenses do not meet the lower pleading standard . . . .”); J & J Sports Prods.,
Inc. v. Coyne, No. C 10–04206 CRB, 2011 WL 227670, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
24, 2011) (Breyer, J.) (same); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Montanez, No. 1:10–
cv–01693–AWI–SKO, 2010 WL 5279907, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010)
(Oberto, Mag.) (same).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (listing potential affirmative defenses). And
this list is unquestionably non-exhaustive. See id. (“In responding to a pleading,
a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including
[listing of defenses].”) (emphasis added). See also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
212 (2007) (confirming that “Rule 8(c) identifies a nonexhaustive list of
affirmative defenses that must be pleaded in response”).
37. See, e.g., Oden v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting that affirmative defenses “will defeat an otherwise legitimate claim for
relief” (citations omitted)).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008)
(“Ordinarily, it is incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove . . . [an
affirmative] defense.”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
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may be deemed waived and, therefore, lost to the defending
litigant forever.39 Consequently, given their potentially pivotal
significance in litigation, as well as the risk posed by omitting
them, it has long been among the “best practices” of prudent
defending parties to include any affirmative defense that might
possibly prove to be germane (regardless of whether the known
facts can snugly support such assertions).40 Whatever Twiqbal
may be understood to mean, it probably does not tolerate that
longstanding approach to affirmative defense pleading.
An attack on a pleaded affirmative defense is resolved under
Rule 12(f)—precisely where this Twiqbal uncertainty now lies.
Although settled legal principles guide the resolution of Rule 12(f)
motions,41 the decision to grant or deny such attacks is considered
to be committed to the trial judge’s sound discretion.42 That
discretion, furthermore, is considered “liberal” in the context of
Rule 12(f).43 Consequently, the authority this standard invests in
the trial judge is vast, bounded only by abject arbitrariness or
legal error. As one court explained the abuse of discretion
130, 133 (2008) (“[T]he law typically treats a limitations defense as an
affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and
that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.”).
39. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (citing Rule 8(c) for
the proposition that “[o]rdinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is
forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto”);
Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 58 (1st
Cir. 2012) (“The law is clear that if an affirmative defense is not pleaded
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)’s requirements, it is waived.”).
40. See Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC),
2011 WL 98573, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“While counsel often plead
vast numbers of affirmative defenses without being sure whether the facts will
ultimately support the defenses, such pleading is done precisely so that the
defenses will be preserved should discovery or further proceedings reveal factual
support.” (quoting Wanamaker v. Albrecht, No. 95-8061, 1996 WL 582738, at *5
(10th Cir. Oct. 11,1996))).
41. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales
underpinning Rule 12(f) decisions).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2012)
(applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a motion to strike); Siskiyou
Reg’l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 559 (9th Cir. 2009)
(same); Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133,
1141–42 (7th Cir. 2009) (same).
43. See BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir.
2007) (“Judges enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f).”).
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standard, it is “abused only where no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ
as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.”44
Moreover, once exercised, this immense discretionary
authority is further insulated from searching appellate review by
two other principles. First, the harmless error rule establishes
that even acknowledged judicial mistakes under Rule 12(f) will
usually be immune from reversal absent proof of prejudice to the
appealing party.45 Second, that opportunity for appellate review
(modest as it may be) will almost certainly have to await the
entry of a case-concluding final order; interlocutory appeals from
a Rule 12(f) strike are extraordinarily unlikely.46 This alone may
end the chance for review. Given that so tiny a portion of federal
civil litigation is actually resolved by trial and the involuntary
entry of an appealable final order,47 the prospects for even the
opportunity for a meaningful appellate review will likely be quite
dim for all but a small portion of challenged Rule 12(f) rulings.
At bottom, then, the specter now confronting federal civil
defendants is this: there is national confusion about how to
44. Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942); see also
Bethel v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 371 Fed. Appx. 57, 61 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Under this standard, we do not disturb the district court’s decision as long as
it is within a range of reasonable choices and is not influenced by any mistake of
law.”); Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d 454, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We review the decision
to grant or deny a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion, and decisions that
are reasonable, that is, not arbitrary, will not be overturned.” (citation omitted)).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (installing harmless error standard); Toth v.
Corning Glass Works, 411 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying harmless
error principles to alleged error in failing to strike a claim).
46. See, e.g., Houston Cnty. Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas,
Inc., 481 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the collateral order rule as a
“narrow doctrine” permitting review of a “small category of decisions” that are
“conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that
are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the
underlying action”); Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st
Cir. 2004) (commenting that immediate appeals from interlocutory orders under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are “hen’s-teeth rare”).
47. See Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial,
LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 3, 4, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingstatement.authcheckdam.p
df (discussing data finding that only 1.8% of civil cases were disposed of by trial).
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properly plead affirmative defenses, notwithstanding that those
defenses may well prove to be case-dispositive in nature,
notwithstanding that they can be deemed waived by being
belatedly (or improperly) asserted, and notwithstanding that the
prospects are indescribably remote for an effective post-trial
appellate review from an adverse Rule 12(f) ruling that is
provably not harmless and so far outside the enormously
sweeping discretionary authority imparted to the district court as
to be reversible. The specter only darkens when one considers the
risk (small though it may be) that a motion to strike will be
granted by the trial judge with prejudice and therefore without
hope of any rescue through repleading.48
That federal civil litigation now finds itself in so untenable a
position is, perhaps, not surprising as the courts continue to work
through the meaning and implications of Twiqbal. However, the
fact that a single litigant—J & J Sports Productions, Inc.—could
encounter the full range of the disparate impact of this national
uncertainty ought to be a clarion call for resolution.
III. A Litigation Exemplar: Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp.
Oftentimes, assessments of the proper functioning of federal
civil practice are gauged on the theoretical plane, where
competing policy and practical concerns are examined in their
predictive states, largely divorced from “boots-on-the-ground”
applied realities. The proper role for Twiqbal in testing the
adequacy of federal defenses (and, particularly, affirmative
defenses) calls for a more applied approach. For that exercise,
this article turns to Weddle v. Bayer AG Corporation.
The Weddle decision offers a helpful platform to guide this
exploration for several reasons. First, the result it reaches and
the reasoning it applies aligns with the emerging national
majority on this Twiqbal question.49 Second, the case comes from
48. See, e.g., Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL
3527065, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (denying defendant’s request to replead
affirmative defenses that the court just struck, ruling that the record did not
reveal the good cause necessary to permit such an amendment).
49. See infra Part IV (surveying judicial opinions on the issue).
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a federal judicial region (the U.S. Ninth Judicial Circuit) that has
been especially active (and internally divided) in considering this
question, allowing for a localized assessment of the issue in both
a predecision and postdecision setting. Third, the opinion is one of
a small handful of cases decided in the context of a single
industry (namely, pharmaceutical and medical device litigation)
and offers the opportunity to view this issue within a topical
litigation environment. Fourth, the case facts make for a
fascinating read.
Although this exemplar case examines this Twiqbal issue in
the context of a defendant’s affirmative defenses, this is not, in
truth, a “defendant” problem. It is, rather, a “defending party”
problem and will confront plaintiffs facing counterclaims and
third parties facing impleader complaints just as certainly as it
confronts original defendants.50 In Weddle, the problem
confronted two defendants sued by a star athlete.
A. Mr. Weddle’s Case and Its Pleadings
Plaintiff Eric S. Weddle plays professional football at the
position of free safety for the National Football League’s San
Diego Chargers.51 He has enjoyed an impressive football career.
He was drafted by the Chargers in 2007 out of the University of
Utah, where his collegiate exploits hearken back to a bygone era
in big-time college football where players routinely pounded out
their team’s defense and, on change of possession, stayed on the
field to run the offense.52 In one particular game during Weddle’s
senior year at Utah (a 17–14 victory in November 2006 over Air
Force), he was in the game for a numbing 90 plays: he made 8
solo tackles as a defensive back, scored twice as a running back,
returned a punt, and held the ball for the team’s placekicker for
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (confirming that answers are expected not just
to complaints but to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party complaints).
51. Player Bio—Eric Weddle, CHARGERS.COM, http://www.chargers.com/
team/roster/eric-weddle/f387ca47-e2bc-4716-9701-45026c431914/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See id. (noting Weddle’s college awards, which include both offensive
and defensive recognitions).
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the winning field goal in overtime.53 (In other college games, he’d
shown still more versatility by being a passer, throwing at least
once for a touchdown.)54 “The only people who spend more time
on the field than Weddle each Saturday,” gushed one sports
columnist, “are referees.”55
It was hardly surprising that, once in the NFL, Weddle’s
success continued. His rookie year, he helped ensure a Chargers’
playoff victory over the Indianapolis Colts by intercepting Peyton
Manning on the goal line.56 He has since been voted to the Pro
Bowl once, named a three-time All-Pro, voted the team’s
defensive player-of-the-year in 2011, and voted the team’s mostvaluable-player in 2012.57 Off the field, Weddle’s public
recognition has led him to become a spokesperson for the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.58
It was Weddle’s prominence as a football player and public
figure that triggered the lawsuit that became Weddle v. Bayer AG
Corp. In August 2009, an odd advertising campaign was launched
to jointly promote a new sports book and antacid tablets.59 For
53. Doug Robinson, Why Not Give Heisman to Utah’s Eric Weddle?,
DESERET NEWS (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
650210369/Why-not-give-Heisman-to-Utahs-Eric-Weddle.html; Utah 17, Air
Force 14, SR/COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Nov. 18, 2006), http://www.sportsreference.com/cfb/boxscores/2006-11-18-air-force.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Player Bio—Eric Weddle,
supra note 51.
54. Robinson, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Player Bio—Eric Weddle, supra note 51.
57. Weddle Voted Chargers Most Valuable Player, CHARGERS.COM (Dec. 28,
2012),
http://www.chargers.com/news/press-releases/2-1/Weddle-Voted-Charg
ers-Most-Valuable-Player/b29a4203-3409-4352-bb91-ff223d682774 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. Trent Toone, Chargers’ Eric Weddle Finds His Joy in the LDS Church,
DESERET NEWS (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
705377418/Chargers-Eric-Weddle-finds-his-joy-in-the-LDS-Church.html?pg=all.
59. Neither the pleadings in the Weddle case nor the court’s Twiqbal
opinion offer any further insights into this curious co-promotion. Perhaps
antacid tablets were considered a natural product-partner for football handbook
users because not all members of the sport’s fandom limit their enjoyment to
“entertainment-only.” Such a surmise would likely have only added to Weddle’s
feelings of affront, as a member of his Church. See Gospel Topics: Gambling,
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, http://www.
lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?locale=0&sourceId=c9bb2f2324d98010VgnVCM100000
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the co-promotion, national sports publisher Athlon Sports
collaborated with Bayer USA, a subsidiary of Bayer AG
Corporation, to jointly promote the 2009 Football Handbook
(published by Athlon) and Alka-Seltzer antacid tablets
(manufactured by Bayer).60 In conjunction with this joint
promotion, national advertising was launched, including a special
promotional packaging for Alka-Seltzer tablets to be sold in WalMart, Walgreens, CVS, and other pharmacies throughout the
country.61 A featured image for both the advertising campaign
and the Alka-Seltzer packaging was a photograph of a running
football player carrying a ball. Evidently, the photo the campaign
chose was an often-used one of Weddle, taken during his 2006
college football season at Utah.62 Neither Weddle’s name nor the
Utah school or team names appear on the athlete’s jersey or
elsewhere in the photo. But it seems that these omissions were
manufactured artificially by “photoshopping” the existing image
to obscure team logos and to darken the running player’s
helmeted face.63 Nonetheless, Weddle contended that, even
“photoshopped,” the image was still “clearly” one of him because
the base photo was unquestionably one that had been taken of his
play (and a widely seen one at that), and because the jersey’s
number (#32) was the number Weddle wore in college (and, also,
later as a pro).64

4d82620a____&vgnextoid=bbd508f54922d010VgnVCM1000004d82620aRCRD
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is
opposed to gambling, including lotteries sponsored by governments. Church
leaders have encouraged Church members to join with others in opposing the
legalization and government sponsorship of any form of gambling.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. Complaint ¶ 20, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS),
2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
61. Id. ¶ 24.
62. See id. ¶ 22 (“[Defendants] selected a photo from an online photo
database of Weddle . . . .”).
63. Chargers’ Weddle Accuses Bayer, Athlon of Unauthorized Use of His
Image, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.
sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/04/22/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/Wed
dle.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
64. Complaint ¶¶ 14 & 22.
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Weddle considered this promotional use of his (albeit
“photoshopped”) photograph to be a misappropriation of his
image and likeness, as well as a deception suggesting—
inaccurately—that he was associated with or had otherwise
endorsed the co-promoted products.65 Weddle’s attorney wrote to
Athlon Sports insisting they cease-and-desist from further use of
the photograph and, when they seemingly failed to do so (or to do
so promptly or sufficiently), Weddle filed his lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California (San
Diego).66 The lawsuit contained eight claims, alleging violations of
the federal and California statutory image misappropriation
laws, the Lanham Act, the California False or Misleading
Advertising Act, the California Preservation and Regulation of
Competition Act, as well as common law misappropriation,
conspiracy to misappropriate, and unauthorized commercial use
of likeness.67 Weddle sought actual damages in the amount of a
reasonable royalty fee, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.68
In their original answer, Athlon Sports and Bayer USA
replied with specific paragraphed denials to Weddle’s allegations,
and then asserted fifteen affirmative defenses.69 Weddle
responded by moving to strike all of the affirmative defenses. He
argued that the defenses “had not complied with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement
of the defense asserted” and were instead “merely . . . bare bone
conclusory allegations” that “fail to put Plaintiff on fair notice of
the nature of the defense.”70 Weddle’s motion was soon mooted,
65. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 62, & 70.
66. Id. ¶¶ 23 (and Exhibit “C”) & 42.
67. Id. ¶¶ 25–84.
68. Id. ¶ 15.
69. These originally pleaded affirmative defenses were (1) failure to state a
claim; (2) lack of standing; (3) innocent infringer/lack of willfulness; (4) no jury
for equitable issues; (5) failure to mitigate; (6) statute of limitations; (7) laches;
(8) First Amendment; (9) newsworthiness; (10) request to strike punitive
damages; (11) NCAA standing; (12) plaintiff not identifiable; (13) waiver;
(14) estoppel; and (15) consent. Answer to Complaint ¶¶ 7–10, Weddle v. Bayer
AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
70. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824,
at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, Weddle
v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, (S.D. Cal. Mar.
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however, when he filed an amended complaint.71 This, in turn,
prompted the two defendants to file a new answer, which again
included specific paragraphed denials, but this time asserted only
five affirmative defenses: (1) lack of standing; (2) innocent
infringer/lack
of
willfulness;
(3) First
Amendment;
(4) newsworthiness; and (5) request to strike punitive damages.72
The last three of these defenses were pleaded exactly as they had
been in the original answer. The first two defenses, however, were
factually enhanced. As originally pleaded, the lack of standing
defense had read simply:
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert some or all of his claims for
relief.73

As reconfigured for the new answer, the defendants elaborated:
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert some or all of his claims for
relief because, among other things, on information and belief
and subject to further discovery, Defendants contend that
Plaintiff assigned to the University of Utah and/or the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) any and all rights to
exploit his name, image, likeness and other indicia of his
identity as he appeared as a player for the University of Utah.74

Similarly, the innocent infringer defense to the original complaint
had read:
To the extent that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s trademark
rights, which Defendants deny, such infringement was innocent
and not willful.75

In the new answer to the amended complaint, defendants
expanded:

26, 2012)).
71. The revised pleading was filed pursuant to an unusual “joint motion”
for leave to file an amended complaint. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *1.
Consequently, the court had no cause to rule upon the first motion to strike.
72. Answer to Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7–9, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No.
11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
73. Answer to Complaint at 7, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817
JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
74. Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 72, at 7.
75. Answer to Complaint, supra note 73, at 7.
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To the extent that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s trademark
or other rights, which Defendants specifically deny,
Defendants did not know or believe at the time the materials
at issue in the First Amended Complaint were created and
distributed that such materials contained or used or could be
recognized as using an image and/or trademark of Plaintiff
and therefore any alleged infringement of Plaintiff’s
trademark or other rights was innocent and not willful.76

Weddle then moved the district judge to strike the
defendants’ five affirmative defenses or, in the alternative, to
compel the defendants to submit a more definite statement.77
B. The Weddle Court’s Ruling
As he framed it, Weddle’s challenge to the five affirmative
defenses Athlon Sports and Bayer USA had pleaded in their new
answer obligated the trial court to make three rulings. First, as a
threshold matter, the court had to determine the federal pleading
standard by which the defendants’ affirmative defenses would be
measured. Second, the court had to apply those standards to
resolve Weddle’s motion to strike the defenses. Third, if the
defenses were not stricken, the court had to determine whether to
order defendants to supply a more specific statement of their
defenses. The judge who was called upon to make these
determinations was the Honorable Janis Lynn Sammartino of the
San Diego federal bench.78
The first two rulings would hinge on Weddle’s request for
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), motions to
76. Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 72, at 7.
77. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
78. Judge Sammartino was nominated to the bench by President George W.
Bush and received her commission in 2007. She was born in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, received her A.B. from Occidental College and her J.D. from
Notre Dame. She served as a San Diego deputy city attorney for eighteen years,
followed by terms on the San Diego municipal and superior courts. See
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Sammartino, Janis Lynn, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow “s” hyperlink; then
click “Sammartino”) (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (providing biography) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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strike. The third would turn on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(e), motions for more specific statements. Neither Rule is
especially hospitable for litigants. Extensive case precedent
confirms that both motions are viewed by courts with “disfavor”
and are to be only sparingly granted.79 Judge Sammartino began
her opinion by noting just that. “[M]otions to strike,” she wrote,
“are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited
importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are
often used as a delaying tactic.”80 Consequently, unless the
matter sought to be stricken could, without “any doubt,” have “no
possible bearing on the subject of the litigation,” motions to strike
should be refused.81 Likewise, she wrote, motions for more
definite statements should only be entertained when the pleading
under attack is “so indefinite” that a responding party would not
“ascertain the nature of the claims being asserted and literally
cannot frame a responsive pleading.”82 With those introductory
principles behind her, Judge Sammartino turned to Weddle’s
motions.
First, the threshold issue of pleading standard had to be
resolved. This compelled the court to tackle the critical Twiqbal
question.
As all federal litigators can probably recite now from
memory, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2007 Twombly decision
formally “retired” the oft-quoted mantra from Conley v. Gibson83
79. See, e.g., 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1380, at 394 (2004) (collecting cases and noting:
“[b]oth because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because
it often is sought by the movant simply as a dilatory or harassing
tactic, numerous judicial decisions make clear that motions under Rule 12(f) are
viewed with disfavor by the federal courts and are infrequently granted”
(footnotes omitted)); id. § 1377, at 338–39 (collecting cases and noting “as a
result of the generally disfavored status of these motions [for a more definite
statement], the proportion of Rule 12(e) requests granted by the district courts
appears to have remained quite low” (citations omitted)).
80. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *1 (quoting Neilson v. Union Bank of
Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
81. Id. (quoting Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
82. Id. (quoting Hubbs v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1254,
1262 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).
83. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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that federal complaints should not be dismissed “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”84 The
Court forced Conley to pasture, it explained, because such a
construction of the federal pleading rules could, if “read in
isolation,” mean that “any statement revealing the theory of the
claim will suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown
from the face of the pleadings.”85 This, the Court concluded, was
an incorrect reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
and its admonition that pleading a federal claim requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”86 Although that austere standard would not
necessitate “detailed factual allegations,” more was expected than
mere “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitation[s] of the
elements of a cause of action.”87 Instead, as Rule 8(a)(2)
commanded, to “show” the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to
relief,” federal pleaders were obligated to supply “enough” factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”88
84. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007) (“[Conley’s]
‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away
long enough . . . [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement.” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46)). See
generally STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN, JOHN B. CORR, FEDERAL
CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 333–36, 452–55 (2013) (discussing background and
principles of Twombly and Iqbal).
85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
86. Id. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
87. Id.
88. Id. The requirements of a “showing” and an “entitle[ment] to relief” are
both found in the text of Rule 8(a)(2) itself. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”
(emphasis added)). The majority found the requirement of a “showing”
corroborative of its conclusion that an adequate factual presentation from
claimants is essential. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3
Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion
of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the
claim, but also “grounds” on which the claim rests.
The requirement of stating the “grounds” for a claim comes a bit more indirectly.
The Rule drafters had expressly required a statement of “grounds” for invoking
the court’s jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (“[A] short and plain
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or, as the Court later casted it, the pleading must “possess
enough heft”89 to “nudge[] . . . claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.”90 This “plausibility” inquiry, explained
the Court, “simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to prove the
allegations.91 “[S]omething beyond . . . mere possibility” is
necessary “lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be
allowed to ‘take up the time of a number of other people, with the
right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the
settlement value.’”92
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed
the “plausibility” test for federal claims, verifying that the
Twombly ruling “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil
actions,’” and rejecting—as “not supported by Twombly and . . .
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”—the
intimation that the ruling ought not apply to all federal
complaints.93 The Court in Iqbal further explained how the
appropriate “plausibility” inquiry progresses linearly through two
steps: first, the court must set aside allegations that are “nothing
more than conclusions,” because, as to those, the court will not
defer to their truth; second, the court must focus on the “wellpleaded” factual allegations, and, as to those, assume their truth
and, then, assess whether they (and only they) plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.94 This “plausibility” inquiry, the Court
concluded, is to be “a context-specific task that requires the
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . .”). But, as the quotation
above confirms, that term is absent from the later obligation of pleading an
entitlement to relief. Nevertheless, the obligation was pronounced summarily by
the Court in Conley v. Gibson. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“[A]ll the Rules
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
(emphasis added)). The Conley Court’s source for this “grounds” obligation is not
expressly identified in that opinion.
89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
90. Id. at 570.
91. Id. at 556.
92. Id. at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharmas., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
347 (2005)) (citations omitted).
93. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
94. Id. at 679.
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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”95
What neither Twombly nor Iqbal addressed, however, was
whether this “plausibility” standard, formulated for claims (that,
under Rule 8(a)(2), must be “show[n]” to have an “entitlement to
relief”96) also applies to general and affirmative defenses. Of
course, that comes as no particular surprise. The Court in both
Twombly and Iqbal was testing the allegations of complaints
against motions to dismiss; there was no occasion to consider, or
cause to rule upon, the pleading standard governing answers.
Had the Court so ventured, however, it likely would have
begun with the text of the implicated Rules.97 The Rules
governing general and affirmative defenses are expressed
differently than the standard for claims. Rule 8(b)(1)(A) requires
of responding parties that they must “state in short and plain
terms [their] defenses to each claim asserted against [them].”98
Rule 8(c)(1) requires further that responding parties “must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”99
Notably, neither provision contains any explicit analogue to Rule
8(a)(2)’s command for a “showing” of an “entitlement to relief,”100
nor the Conley Court’s command for an exposition of “grounds.”101
In her research, Judge Sammartino in Weddle found no U.S.
court of appeals decision ruling squarely on this question of
whether Twiqbal applied to defenses.102 She also determined that
95. Id.
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
97. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)
(“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and
generally with them as with a statute, ‘[w]hen we find the terms . . .
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted)).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
101. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (requiring a statement of
the grounds of plaintiff’s claim).
102. See Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL
1019824, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (noting a lack of appellate rulings on
the issue). That remains true as this Article goes to press. None of the U.S.
courts of appeals has expressly ruled whether Twiqbal should, or should not,
apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Herrera v. Churchill
McGee, LLC, 680 F.3d 539, 547 n.6 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We . . . have no occasion to
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the district courts within the Ninth Circuit “have gone both
ways.”103 (Interestingly, in the string-citation she offered to
illustrate this division, Judge Sammartino tended towards
modeling the national trend on the issue—of the five cases she
cited, four rejected Twiqbal’s application to defenses and the one
case that embraced the notion was also the earliest one in time,
decided in 2007, on the heels of the Twombly opinion.)104 After
surveying this split and considering the competing arguments,
she ruled that “Twombly’s heightened pleading standard does not
apply to Defendants’ defenses.”105 Instead, citing what she found
to be controlling local circuit precedent on the issue, Judge
Sammartino held that “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair
notice of the defense.”106
Second, having settled on the governing legal standard for
Weddle’s motion to strike, the court then proceeded to test the
five challenged affirmative defenses. She ruled that none of the
Athlon Sports/Bayer USA affirmative defenses ought to be
stricken:
First Affirmative Defense—Lack of Standing: Weddle had
attacked this first defense as “bare bone conclusory
allegations” that “fail[] to [give] Plaintiff fair notice of the
nature of the defense.”107 Judge Sammartino, however,
corrected the plaintiff: unlike the original answer (which had
been pleaded in “bare bones” fashion), the answer to the
amended complaint added enhancement details and was
sufficient to impart fair notice of the defendants’ factual
address, and express no view regarding, the impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), on
affirmative defenses.”).
103. Id.
104. See id. at *2 (citing cases). In fact, this one outlier “Twiqbal-applies”
case among Judge Sammartino’s five citations was decided on August 13,
2007—less than 90 days after Twombly was released and in the veritable
maelstrom that marked the early reaction to the new “plausibility” principle.
See id. (noting Anticancer, Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal.
2007) as the one outlier case).
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id. (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir.
1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957))).
107. Id. at *3 n.1.
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argument, namely “that Plaintiff lacks standing because he
has assigned his rights to the NCAA or the University of
Utah.”108
Second Affirmative Defense—Innocent Infringer: Weddle had
attacked this second defense as legally insufficient because
ignorance of the law is ordinarily no excuse for misconduct.109
Again, the court corrected the plaintiff: defendants were not
claiming ignorance of the law but rather seeking to negate an
element of plaintiff’s case (namely, knowledge).110 The court
agreed with Weddle that the averment was not a true
“affirmative defense” because all it proposed to do was
“negate[] an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”111
Even so, however, strikes are disfavored, and because Weddle
could show no prejudice from allowing the allegation to
remain, the motion to strike was denied.112
Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses—First Amendment &
Newsworthiness: Weddle challenged these defenses as failing
to supply him or the court with “notice of the specific legal
basis and/or facts for avoiding liability for the claims alleged in
the Complaint based upon the constitutional grounds asserted
in such defense.”113 Although acknowledging the averments to
be “somewhat sparse as to how the referenced constitutional
provisions serve to protect Defendants from liability or how
the newsworthiness of the publication bears on Defendants’
liability,” the court found that Weddle had received “notice of
the defense asserted,” and that sufficed.114
Fifth Affirmative Defense—Punitive Damages: Lastly, Weddle
challenged the adequacy of defendants’ contentions that
punitive damages could not be awarded because no facts
supported such relief and because both the vagueness doctrine
and the Constitution would forbid it.115 The court rejected this
challenge as well, ruling that the averment was either a

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
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nonprejudicially mislabeled general defense or adequate “fair
notice of the defense asserted.”116

Third and finally, Judge Sammartino turned to Weddle’s
alternative request that defendants be ordered to file a more
definite statement. Here, too, Weddle met no success. The court
noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits such
more definite statement requests only “of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed.”117 Because plaintiffs are not
generally “allowed” to file a responsive pleading to a defendant’s
answer, and because Judge Sammartino had not granted Weddle
special leave to so respond, the predicate for Rule 12(e) relief was
absent.118 Weddle’s motion thus denied in its entirety, the case
proceeded on.
C. The Weddle Court’s Rationale
As Judge Sammartino weighed her decision on whether to
apply Twiqbal “plausibility” to affirmative defenses, she enjoyed
the benefit of consulting a fruitful body of precedent within her
judicial region, the Ninth Circuit. As of the date she ruled, at
least fifteen of her trial-level circuit colleagues had written postIqbal opinions on the issue and, though divided, a majority view
was emerging. At least nine of those courts ruled that Twiqbal
should not apply to affirmative defenses,119 at least five held that
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e)).
118. Id. at *5.
119. Twiqbal Not Applied: Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–
00481–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–
cv–00854–RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 607539 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012); Kohler v. Islands
Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012); Meas v. CVS Pharmacy,
Inc., No. 11cv0823 JM(JMA), 2011 WL 2837432 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011); J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 2132723 (S.D.
Cal. May 27, 2011); In re Washington Mut., Inc., Secs., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., No. 08–md–1919 MJP, 2011 WL 1158387 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2011); J
& J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, No. CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX, 2011 WL
720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. C&K Mkt., Inc., No. CV
10–465–MO, 2011 WL 587574 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2011); Garber v. Mohammadi,
No. CV 10–7144–DDP (RNB), 2011 WL 2076341 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011);
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it should,120 and one touched on the issue without making a
definitive ruling.121 This bounty of case law, along with the
briefing of the litigants Weddle, Athlon Sports, and Bayer AG,
ensured her ability to assess the issue comprehensively.
In the end, the emerging Ninth Circuit (and national)
majority view on the question persuaded her. In ruling that
Twiqbal “plausibility” ought not to apply to affirmative defenses,
the court relied on two core arguments, one textual and one
functional.
Textually, Judge Sammartino zeroed in on the syntax
differences between Rule 8(a)(2), which addresses claims, and
Rule 8(c)(1), which addresses affirmative defenses. As noted
earlier, the former obligates claimants to plead a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”122 Conversely, Rule 8(c)(1) requires only that “a party
must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”123
To Judge Sammartino, this was a distinction with a difference.
The Supreme Court’s linkage of the “plausibility” test to this Rule
8(a)(2) “showing”/“grounds”/“entitlement-to-relief” triumvirate
not only explained the origination of the test itself,124 but also
served to distinguish it from other pleading rules (like Rule
8(c)(1)) that contain none of those three terms. These
Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC,
2010 WL 2803907 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010).
120. Twiqbal Applied: Dion v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, No. 112727SC, 2012 WL 160221 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012); Yates v. Perko’s Café, Nos.
C 11–00873 SI, C 11–1571, 2011 WL 2580640 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011); J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No. CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 794826
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained
Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2010); CTF Dev’t, Inc. v. Penta
Hospitality, LLC, No. C 09–02429 WHA, 2009 WL 3517617 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2009).
121. Twiqbal Unresolved: Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alvarado, No. 1:10–
cv–00907 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 4746165 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010).
122. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
123. Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1)).
124. See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly and
Iqbal); see also Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *2 (highlighting language
differences between Rules 8(a)(2) and 8(c)(1)).
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“differences in the plain language of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 8(c),”
concluded Judge Sammartino, “suggest that less is required for
pleading affirmative defenses.”125
Functionally, Judge Sammartino reasoned that concerns of
practicality and judicial economy verified her decision not to
apply Twiqbal. “Some of these considerations include the
limited time a defendant has to prepare an answer to the
complaint, avoidance of the need to repeatedly amend an answer
to assert later-discovered defenses, and discouragement of
motions to strike brought for dilatory or harassment
purposes.”126 These responding-party considerations were not
mirrored in claiming-party pleadings, and provided the court
with a measure of corroborating justification for the Weddle
opinion result.
Together, these textual and functional concerns convinced
Judge Sammartino to reject Twiqbal’s “plausibility” approach
for testing the Athlon Sports/Bayer AG affirmative defenses:
“Thus, the Court concludes that Twombly’s heightened pleading
standard does not apply to defendants’ affirmative defenses.”127
Without the Twiqbal modification, the incumbent Ninth Circuit
standard, set by its Court of Appeals in 1979, would govern:
“[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an
affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the
defense.”128
In the time that has passed since Judge Sammartino
rendered her decision in Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., at least
fifty-five more district judges within the Ninth Circuit have
issued Twiqbal decisions of their own on affirmative defenses.
125. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *2.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id. Judge Sammartino’s reference to Twiqbal as a “heightened”
pleading requirement may reflect her own impressions of the “plausibility”
standard in operation, or her view of the standard’s contrast to the “no-set-offacts” formulation Justice Hugo Black coined in Conley v. Gibson. In either
event, the reference would probably not be one the Supreme Court would
embrace. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (“[W]e do
not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard . . . .”).
128. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d
824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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But, unlike the modestly divided precedent Judge Sammartino
confronted, the newer precedent points in a far more hopelessly
divided direction. Twenty-three of those opinions joined her in
rejecting Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses, 129
twenty applied Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, 130 and twelve
129. Twiqbal Not Applied: Garity v. Donahoe, No. 2:11-CV-01805-MMD,
2013 WL 4774761 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 2013); Burton v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC,
No. CV-F-13-0307-LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 4736838 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013);
Pickern v. Chico Steakhouse, LP, No. 12-cv-02586-TLN-CMK, 2013 WL 4051640
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013); DC Labs, Inc. v. Celebrity Signatures Int’l, Inc., No. 12CV-01454 BEN (DHB), 2013 WL 4026366 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013); Pacific
Dental Servs., LLC v. Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST (JPRx),
2013 WL 3776337 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2013); Polk v. Legal Recovery Law Offices,
No. 12-CV-0641-W-MDD, 2013 WL 3147728 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2013);
Devermont v. City of San Diego, No. 12-CV-01823 BEN (KSC), 2013 WL
2898342 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2013); Vogel v. AutoZone Parts, Inc., No. CV-130300-CAS (AJWx), 2013 WL 2395905 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2013); Diaz v.
Alternative Recovery Mgmt., No. 12-CV-1742-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL 1942198
(S.D. Cal. May 8, 2013); Vogel v. Linden Optometry APC, No. CV 13-0295 GAF
(SHx), 2013 WL 1813686 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013); Roe v. City of San Diego, No.
12-CV-0243-W-(WVG), 289 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2013); Kohler v.
Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, No. 11-CV-2025-W-BLM, 2013 WL 544058
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV00481-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV-00485-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV-00853-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV00854-RCJ-VPC, 2013 WL 499158 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2013); Palmason v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., No. C11-695RSL, 2013 WL 392705 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31,
2013); Rapp v. Lawrence Welk Resort, No. 12-CV-01247 BEN (WMc), 2013 WL
358268 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. North Am. Mktg. &
Assocs., LLC, No. CV–12–0914–PHX–DGC, 2012 WL 5034967 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18,
2012); Walker-Cook v. Integrated Health Res., LLC, Civ. No. 12–00146 ACK–
RLP, 2012 WL 4461159 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2012); Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan
Maritime LLC, Civ. No. 08–00482 JMS/KSC, 2012 WL 3113168 (D. Haw. July
31, 2012); G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Mitropoulos, No. CV12–0163–
PHX DGC, 2012 WL 3028368 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc.
v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT, 2012 WL 2919681 (D. Ariz. July 17,
2012); Figueroa v. Baja Fresh Westlake Vill., Inc., No. CV 12–769–GHK (SPx),
2012 WL 2373254 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012); Kohler v. Big 5 Corp., No. 2:12–cv–
00500–JHN–SPx, 2012 WL 1511748 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012); Figueroa v.
Marshalls of Cal., LLC, No. CV11–06813–RGK (SPx), 2012 WL 1424400 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2012).
130. Twiqbal Applied: Figueroa v. Stater Bros. Mkts., Inc., No. CV-13-3364
FMO (JEMx), 2013 WL 4758231 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013); ADP: Commercial
Leasing, Inc. v. M.G. Santos, Inc., No. CV-F-13-0587-LJO-SKO, 2013 WL
3863897 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2013); Nextdoor.Com, Inc. v. Abhyanker, No. C-125667-EMC, 2013 WL 3802526 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013); Vogel v. Huntington
Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, No 2:13-cv-842-ODW(MANx), 2013 WL 3337803 (C.D.
Cal. July 2, 2013); Gandeza v. Brachfeld Law Group, No. C 13-0810 SC, 2013
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were inconclusive.131
IV. A Survey of the Case Law Ruling on Twiqbal’s Applicability to
Affirmative Defenses
As this Article goes to press, more than 230 federal decisions
have addressed the question of Twiqbal’s applicability to
affirmative defenses in the period since the Supreme Court
WL 3286187 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2013); Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., No.
C 12-04936 LB, 2013 WL 31553388 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2013); Cabrera v.
Alvarez, No. C 12-04890 SI, 2013 WL 3146788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013);
Dodson v. Munirs Co., No. CIV. S-13-0399 LKK/DAD, 2013WL 3146818 (E.D.
Cal. June 18, 2013); Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co., No. CIV. S-130402 LKK/EFN, 289 F.R.D. 595 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013); J & J Sports Prods.,
Inc. v. Barwick, No. 5:12-CV-05284-LHK, 2013 WL 2083123 (N.D. Cal. May 14,
2013); Catch A Wave, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. C-12-05791-WHA, 2013
WL 1996134 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2013); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Pittsburg
Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. C-12-05523-WHA , 2013 WL 2009681 (N.D. Cal.
May 13, 2013); Righetti v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections & Rehab., No. C-11-2717EMC, 2013 WL 1891374 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Polo v. Shwiff, No. C 12-04461
JSW, 2013 WL 1797671 (N.D. Cal Apr. 29, 2013); Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros., No.
C-12-04590, 2013 WL 1786636 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013); Spears v. First
American Eappraiseit, No. 5-08-CV-00868-RMW, 2013 WL 1748284 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2013); Ross v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-009687ODW(JCx), 2013 WL 1344831 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013); Ansari v. Electronic
Document Processing, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01245-LHK, 2013 WL 664676 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 22, 2013); O’Sullivan v. AMN Servs., Inc., No. C–12–02125 JCS, 2012
WL 2912061 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2012); Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc.,
No. C 10–945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012).
131. Twiqbal Unresolved: Hernandez v. Creative Concepts, Inc., No. 2:10CV-02132-PMP-VCF, 2013 WL 4399235 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2013); Dodson v. CSK
Auto, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00346-GEB-AC, 2013 WL 3942002 (E.D. Cal. July 30,
2013); Intermountain Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Michael’s Manor, LLC,, No.
4:12-cv-00645-BLW, 2013 WL 3944259 (D. Idaho July 29, 2013); Charter Oak
Fire Ins. Co. v. Interstate Mech., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-01505-PK, 2013 WL 3809466
(D. Or. July 23, 2013); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., v. Dorsett, No. 12-CV-1715JAM-EFB, 2013 WL 1339231 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); Fleming v. Escort, Inc.,
No. 1:12–CV–066–BLW, 2013 WL 870632 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2013); J & J Sports
Prods., Inc. v. Bear, No. 1:12–cv–01509–AWI–SKO, 2013 WL 708490 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 26, 2013); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. ED CV 11–1600 PSG (SPx), 2013
WL 228501 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Catano, No.
1:12–cv–00739–LJO–JLT, 2012 WL 5424677 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012); J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Sanchez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74070 (E.D. Cal. May 29,
2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Romero, No. 1:11–cv–1880–AWI–BAM, 2012
WL 1435004 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); Botell v. United States, No. 2:11–cv–
01545–GEB–GGH, 2012 WL 1027270 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
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decided the Iqbal case in May 2009.132 Plotting that case law is an
instructive exercise, both because of what it informs and because
practicing attorneys need ready access to this now highly
localized federal practice standard. That survey reveals what
certainly seems to be an emerging consensus, and that consensus
favors the same outcome the court in Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp.
embraced. This, perhaps, is one of the more truly fascinating
aspects of Weddle—more than six years after Twombly was
decided, the question Weddle tackled of proper affirmative
defense pleading remains inconclusively resolved and still subject
to not only circuit-by-circuit uncertainty but district-by-district
(and, indeed, chambers-by-chambers) uncertainty.133 This
frequently litigated Twiqbal spin-off issue has emerged as a
paradigmatic trap for the unwary.

132. In the post-Twombly and pre-Iqbal period, it remained uncertain
whether the Supreme Court intended its “plausibility” test to be given a
constrained reach—for example, to govern pleadings only in antitrust cases, or
inference-heavy cases, or complex and sprawling discovery cases. That
uncertainty was resolved by the Court in its May 18, 2009 opinion in Iqbal,
where it made clear that “plausibility” is to be used to govern the adequacy of
complaints in all federal civil litigation. See supra notes 83–95 and
accompanying text (elaborating on the progression from Twombly to Iqbal).
Because the federal judiciary remained unclear on the reach of “plausibility”
until Iqbal was decided, it seems prudent to begin the assessment of the courts’
treatment of “plausibility” in the affirmative defenses context from that date.
To accommodate publication deadlines, the inclusion of new cases ended as of
September 15, 2013.
133. See, e.g., CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Draper & Kramer Mortg. Corp., No.
4:10CV1784 FRB, 2012 WL 3984497, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2012)
(“[D]iffering opinions appear to have been rendered by courts sitting within this
district alone.”); Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 565 (S.D. Cal.
2012) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted the Twombly/Iqbal
pleading standard for affirmative defenses [plaintiff] cites to several district
courts that have . . . [defendant] directs the Court to at least one opinion from
within this district that has declined to [do so].” (citations and footnotes
omitted)); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Educ. Loans Inc., Civ. No. 11–1445
(RHK/JJG), 2011 WL 5520437, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011) (“[C]ourts within
this district have reached inconsistent conclusions.”).
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A. The Majority Trend Rejects Twiqbal for Defenses, but the
Minority View Remains Substantial
In writing one of these Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses
opinions, it had become, over time, de rigueur for the deciding
judge to start each decision by announcing that the “majority” or
“most” of the nation’s courts hold the view that “plausibility”
applies.134 Such incantations have diminished a bit of late, as
newer court opinions seem to have noticed a change in that
national trend,135 but those pronouncements of a pro-Twiqbal
134. See, e.g., Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civil Action No. H–11–3851, 2012
WL 3527065, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (“A majority of District Courts have
applied the heightened Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”);
EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR, 2012 WL 3242168, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (“A majority of courts have concluded that the
plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal applies to the sufficiency
of affirmative defenses.”); Weed v. Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL
2469544, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2012) (“[T]he majority of district courts that
have opined on the matter have concluded that the Twombly/Iqbal standard
applies to affirmative defenses.”); Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. C
10–945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (“[M]ost have
found that the heightened pleading standard does apply to affirmative
defenses.”); Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416,
2011 WL 5118325, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (“The majority of district
courts . . . have concluded that the Twombly-Iqbal approach does apply to
affirmative defenses.”); EEOC v. Kelly Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ.
655(LTS)(MHD), 2011 WL 3163443, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (“[M]ost
lower courts that have considered the question of the standard applicable to
pleading of defenses have held that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, as elucidated in
Twombly and Iqbal, governs the sufficiency of the pleading of affirmative
defenses.”); Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 10–03355–CV–W–DGK, 2011 WL
1050004, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2011) (“[T]he majority of district courts that
have considered this question have determined that it makes sense to apply the
Iqbal standards to affirmative defenses.”); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean
Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011)
(“Most . . . have found that Twombly/Iqbal should apply to affirmative
defenses . . . .”).
135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala.
July 9, 2012) (“[T]he growing minority of district courts . . . have held that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard does not apply to affirmative
defenses.”); Figueroa v. Baja Fresh Westlake Vill., Inc., No. CV 12–769–GHK
(SPx), 2012 WL 2373254, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012) (“[N]umerous courts . . .
have declined to extend the Twombly/Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”);
Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *14 n.4 (D. Utah
Apr. 19, 2012) (“[A] growing number of district courts are declining to extend the
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“majority” view continue to persist.136 The irony of these
incantations lies with the national data itself. The incantations
are wrong.
In the months immediately after the Supreme Court’s May
2009 decision in Iqbal, only a modest majority of opinions favored
the application of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, and by 2011,
the decided majority had shifted in the other direction.137
Recently, a growing number of courts have sidestepped the
controversy entirely, ruling that application of any standard
would produce the same result (though those courts differ
markedly on what that outcome would be).138 A charting of those
decisions, by date and court, is appended to the end of this
Article, followed by a reordering of that same data by district and
deciding judge. In sum, that charting of the post-Iqbal case law
on affirmative defenses looks like this:

Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative defenses, and it is unclear
whether that approach is still a majority position.”); Paducah River Painting,
Inc. v. McNational, Inc., No. 5:11–CV–00135–R, 2011 WL 5525938, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (“[T]he district courts that have commented on it appear
evenly divided.”); Willis v. Quad Lakes Enters., L.L.C., No. 4:11–CV–00096–
SWH, 2011 WL 3957339, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2011) (“A number of recent
decisions have determined that the heightened pleading requirements in
Twombly do not apply to affirmative defenses.”).
136. See, e.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Barwick, No. 5:12-CV-05284-LHK,
2013 WL 2083123, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2013) (“The vast majority of district
courts have held that the standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal apply to
affirmative defenses as well.”); Staton v. North State Acceptance, LLC, No. 1:13CV-277, 2013 WL 3910153, at *2 (M.D.N.C. July 29, 2013) (“[T]he majority of
district courts have concluded that the particularity and plausibility standard
from Iqbal/Twombly does apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses.”);
Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL 3527065, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (“A majority of District Courts have applied the heightened
Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”); Gonzalez v. Heritage
Pac. Fin., LLC, No. 2:12–cv–01816–ODW (JCGx), 2012 WL 3263749, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (“The majority of district courts have held that the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard applies equally to the pleading of affirmative
defenses as it does to the pleading of claims for relief in a complaint.”); Weed v.
Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL 2469544, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28,
2012) (“[T]he majority of district courts that have opined on the matter have
concluded that the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to affirmative defenses.”).
137. See infra Appendix of Cases (collecting cases treating the issue).
138. See id. (delineating cases where Twiqbal was and was not applied).
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*

Year

Cases
Applying
Twiqbal

Cases Not
Applying
Twiqbal

Inconclusive
Cases

2009*

3 (50%)

3 (50%)

0 (0%)

2010

10 (50%)

8 (40%)

2 (10%)

2011

13 (21.3%)

42 (68.9%)

6 (9.8%)

2012

10 (17.6%)

28 (54.9%)

14 (27.5%)

2013#

30 (32.3%)

44 (47.3%)

19 (20.4%)

Totals

66 (28.4%)

125
(53.9%)

41 (17.7%)

Since May 2009 (Date of Iqbal)
September 15, 2013

# Through

Applying
Twiqbal

Not Applying
Twiqbal

Total
Judges

49 (32.9%)

100 (67.1%)

Total
Opinions

66 (34.6%)

125 (65.4%)

Thus, there is indeed today a national majority on the issue of
Twiqbal’s applicability to affirmative defenses, but it is decidedly
in the direction of refusing to apply “plausibility” to such
pleadings. If those opinions that sidestepped the issue are
removed from the study, the resulting margin is more striking
still—judges are rejecting Twiqbal for testing affirmative
defenses by very nearly a two-to-one margin.
The Weddle opinion was decided in the context of
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation (albeit an atypical
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variant on the normal drug and device type of dispute). That
litigation section is a vibrant one,139 and examining one litigation
section is also instructive. Here, in the pharmaceutical and
medical device cohort of Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses cases,
the issue has been explored only infrequently. Nonetheless, and
though small, this industry-litigation cohort, too, and by a strong
margin, favors the resolution Judge Sammartino chose.140
139. See generally William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541 (2011)
(discussing Twiqbal generally in this section’s litigation experience).
140. Eleven other district judges have joined Judge Sammartino in rejecting
Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses in drug and device litigations. See
DC Labs, Inc. v. Celebrity Signatures Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-01454 BEN (DHB),
2013 WL 4026366, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (ruling that Court “will apply
the more lenient ‘fair notice’ standard”); Pacific Dental Servs., LLC v. Homeland
Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST (JPRx), 2013 WL 3776337, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. July 17, 2013) (“[T]here is good reason to conclude that Twombly/Iqbal do
not apply to affirmative defenses . . . .”); United States ex rel Health Dimensions
Rehab., Inc. v. Rehabcare Group, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-00848 AGF, 2013 WL
2182343, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2013) (view “more persuasive and consistent
with the intent of all aspects of Rule 8”); Warren v. Tri Tech Labs., Inc., No.
6:12-cv-00046, 2013 WL 2111669, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Va. May 15, 2013) (following
fellow District judges in rejecting Twiqbal’s applicability); Vogel v. Linden
Optometry APC, No. CV 13-0295 GAF (SHx), 2013 WL 1813686, at *2-*3 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 30, 2013) (applying incumbent Ninth Circuit “fair notice” standard,
rather than Twiqbal); Senju Pharma. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 297,
303 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 2013) (“Due to the ‘differences between Rules 8(a) and 8(c) in
text and purpose, [ ] Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses,’
which ‘need not be plausible to survive.’”); Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock
Labs., Inc., C.A. No. 11–733–LPS, 2012 WL 4565013, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 1, 2012)
(rejecting the application of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Walker-Cook v.
Integrated Health Res., LLC, Civ. No. 12–00146 ACK–RLP, 2012 WL 4461159,
at *3 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2012) (“[C]ourts in this district have declined to extend
the pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses.”); Ferring
B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–00481–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–
RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00854–RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL
607539, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) (declining to apply Twiqbal to affirmative
defense); Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, Civ. No. 10–1045
RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (“[T]his Court agrees
with those courts that have found Twombly/Iqbal inapplicable to affirmative
defenses.”); Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11cv0823 JM(JMA), 2011 WL
2837432, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (“Although a close issue, the court
concludes that affirmative defenses are not subject to a heightened pleading
standard.”). In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
likewise not applied Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, though its opinion on the
issue never squarely confronts Twombly or Iqbal, and there is no certain
indication that the precise question of Twiqbal’s possible application was ever
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In surveying the full post-Iqbal national case law on the
applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses (and, more
precisely, those cases that squarely ruled on the issue), one might
catalogue the various approaches used by the district judges into
three groups:
1) “Plausibility” Governs: The Twiqbal “plausibility”
approach applies, and is used by the court to test the
pleading adequacy of affirmative defenses, in much the
same manner as it would test a complaint;
2) “Factual Notice” Governs: “Plausibility” does not
apply, but affirmative defenses are nevertheless
required to have a measure of factual detail in order to
survive challenge;
3) “Issue Notice” Governs: “Plausibility” does not apply,
and a pleader is held solely to impart simple notice
that the issue raised by the affirmative defense exists,
without any further obligation to show how that issue
is implicated under the case’s facts.141
asserted by the parties. See Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 467–68 (6th
Cir. 2009) (refusing to find waiver in a conclusorily pleaded statute of repose
defense because “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
heightened pleading standard for a statute of repose defense”).
Two judges have reached the opposite view, and held that Twiqbal does
apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses. See Nixson v. Health Alliance, No.
1:10–CV–00338, 2010 WL 5230867, at *2 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 16, 2010) (applying
Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Castillo v. Roche Labs. Inc., No. 10–20876–
CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010) (same).
Another judge rejected the “plausibility” test, but seemed to apply Twiqbal’s
“no-conclusions” instruction. See Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of
Johnston, LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725 (W.D. Va. 2010) (requiring sufficient
facts be alleged for the court to conclude the pleader is entitled to relief).
And three judges sidestepped the issue. See GN Hearing Care Corp. v.
Advanced Hearing Ctrs., Inc., No. CV-WDQ-12-3181, 2013 WL 4401230, at *1
(D. Md. Aug. 14, 2013) (“[E]ven assuming that the Twombly/Iqbal standard
governs defenses, GN Hearing can acquire—and likely has acquired—the
necessary facts through discovery . . . .”); United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS
Caremark Corp., No. CIV-09-4672, 2013 WL 1755214, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
24, 2013) (choosing not to “conclusively resolv[e] the debate”); Purdue Pharma
L.P. v. Ranbaxy Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3734(SHS), 2012 WL 3854640 at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 2012) (“The Court need not enter this debate because Actavis’s defense
satisfies the higher standard of Twombly.”).
141. See Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011 WL
3803668, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (describing varying approaches); Tyco
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The first of these views is readily described. It is Twiqbal
unvarnished—the two-step path that disregards legal
conclusions, and then assesses the remaining factual averments
for “plausibility”—applied to test affirmative defenses.142 “Bare
bones” or conclusory allegations will not survive such an
inquiry.143 As one district court explained: when affirmative
defenses set “forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of
any supporting factual content,” they likewise fail to set forth
“the nature of the asserted defense,” “violate Rule 8’s general
pleading requirements,” and must be stricken.144
The second view expresses a middle ground position. It does
not require a “plausibility” assessment, but nor will it always
tolerate a conclusory affirmative defense lacking any expression
of factual relevance to the plaintiff’s claims. This view may also
coincide with a particular circuit’s longstanding precedent that
predates Twiqbal.145 Although courts vary in the nomenclature
they use to describe this middle ground view,146 one court’s
exposition is illustrative of the approach. That court tested an
Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899–901 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(same).
142. See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Twombly and Iqbal).
143. See Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL 3527065,
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (noting that affirmative defense that “merely
recites the common law requirements, without facts in support,” is insufficient:
“Without facts in support, a bare recitation of the elements does not reach the
standard set in Twombly and must be struck”).
144. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011
WL 5118325, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011).
145. See EEOC v. Kelly Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 655(LTS)(MHD),
2011 WL 3163443, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (noting that in the Second
Circuit, “[i]t has long been held that affirmative defenses that contain only ‘bald
assertions’ without supporting facts should be stricken” (citing pre-Twiqbal
authority)).
146. Indeed, some courts simply attribute this fact-pleading obligation to the
“fair notice” requirement, without affixing a special title. See Dann v. Lincoln
Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[Defendant] has failed to
provide [plaintiff] with fair notice of the nature of some of its defenses; [some]
represent bare bones allegations that not only include no facts, but also fail to
allege legal elements.”); United States v. Brink, Civ. No. C–10–243, 2011 WL
835828, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011) (asserting that circuit law mandates
application of Twombly to affirmative defenses).
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affirmative defense averring that recovery “is barred by the
doctrine of estoppel by [plaintiff’s] own words and actions and
upon which [defendant] relied and acted.”147 The court refused
plaintiff’s invitation to examine this allegation’s “plausibility,”
but then cautioned that this was “not a license for a responsive
pleader to either plead a form-book list of affirmative defenses or
plead those defenses so cryptically that their possible application
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.”148 Instead,
the court explained, the responding pleading must include
sufficient facts to be “contextually comprehensible”:
Just as Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” the court
should not construe and administer the Rules in a manner
that forces the plaintiff to incur undue expense to discover the
secrets of a contextually incomprehensible affirmative
defense.149

Though different from Twiqbal, the court noted that its
“contextual comprehensibility” standard “will often produce the
same result” as Twiqbal.150
Notably, however, while the courts that embrace this second
standard find that application of the “factual notice” test
produces definitive results, they disagree on what level of notice
the test commands. For example, one court, after announcing its
intention to apply the standard, found that “boilerplate defenses
that lack factual support” fail to meet the standard.151 Another
court (from the same state, though a different district) found
quite differently that austerely pleaded affirmative defenses
“provide fair notice of the defense to Plaintiff.”152
The third of these views asks merely if the plaintiffs are
placed on notice of the legal type of affirmative defense they will
147. Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of Johnston, LLC, 752 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 727 (W.D. Va. 2010) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 726.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 727 n.5.
151. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Catano, No. 1:12–cv–00739–LJO–JLT, 2012
WL 5424677, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012).
152. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL
2132723, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
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be confronting. That an averment is “bare bones” or baldly
conclusory is, to this group of courts, of no consequence because
that is all the work that a responding pleader’s affirmative
defenses are required to do. One such court’s treatment is
illustrative of this approach. In denying a motion to strike several
cursorily pleaded affirmative defenses, the court explained:
[E]ach of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, though void of
factual details, provide Plaintiffs with fair notice because
Plaintiffs are now aware that the issue exists. Under the
notice pleading standard, Defendant was obligated only to
provide “knowledge that the issue exists, and not precisely
how the issue is implicated under the facts of a given case.”153

In other words, if the defending parties advise that they may be
defending on the basis of time-bar, waiver, and release, the
plaintiff has been told enough to meet the federal pleading
standard.
Which of these variations is the correct view, the one most
faithful to the federal pleading regime set out by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure? To answer that question is to explore
the competing considerations that drove the district courts to
their various conclusions, and then to assess the merits of those
analyses. To do so, the bifurcation Judge Sammartino adopted in
Weddle—textual considerations and functional considerations—is
a useful path.
B. The Textual Argument Debate
In her decision in Weddle, Judge Sammartino began her
analysis with the text of the implicated Rules themselves. Of
course, this is as it must be. The Rules must be given “their plain
meaning” and, just like in statutory construction, when the Rules
are found to be “unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.”154
153. Weed v. Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL 2469544, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. June 28, 2012) (citation omitted); see also Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic
Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[T]he requisite notice is provided
where the affirmative defense in question alerts the adversary to the existence
of the issue for trial.”).
154. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)
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The text of the Rule governing the pleading of a claim (Rule
8(a)(2)) unquestionably differs from the text of the Rule governing
the pleading of an affirmative defense (Rule 8(c)(1)).155 As Judge
Sammartino correctly noted, the “showing”/“entitlement-to-relief”
requirements for claim-pleading do not appear in the far more
austere “affirmatively state” standard for defense-pleading.156
Alone, this nonsymmetrical choice of language by the drafters of
the two Rules would seem to counsel caution before giving a
symmetrical interpretation to the two Rules’ application.157 That
interpretative inclination has a venerable lineage in the
analogous context of statutory construction.158 It would seem to
apply with far stronger force here, where the Supreme Court, in
its Twombly opinion, appears to explain (and justify) its
“plausibility” test as expressing the correct interpretation of the
“showing”/“entitlement-to-relief” mandate set out by the language
of Rule 8(a)(2)’s claim-pleading requirement.159 It would stand to
reason that because the affirmative defense requirements of Rule
8(c)(1) omits this “showing”/“entitlement-to-relief” requirement,
the Twiqbal “plausibility” test which emanates from precisely

(quotations and citations omitted).
155. Supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Sammartino’s textual analysis of the Rules).
157. The District Court in Alabama made the point crisply in EEOC v. Joe
Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
If the drafters of Rule 8 intended for defendants to plead affirmative
defenses with the factual specificity required of complaints, they would
have included the same language requiring a “showing” of “entitle[ment]
to relief” in the subsections governing answers and affirmative defenses.
That Rules 8(b) and 8(c) contain no such language should end a court’s
inquiry.
158. See Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (“[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 778 (2008) (citation omitted))); id. (“We
refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections
has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference
to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
159. Supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text.
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those requirements of a different Rule is likewise out of place. As
one court resolved the point:
Twombly and Iqbal did not introduce the requirement of
showing entitlement to relief under Rule 8(a)(2), they
interpreted it. . . . And they did this by interpreting language
that is not present in Rule 8(b)(1)(A) [the general defenses
rule]. This Court will not import that language, nor Twombly
and Iqbal’s interpretation of it, to a different rule that lacks
that language.160

Not all courts have drawn the same meaning from this
textual difference, however. Others, though conceding the textual
differences, emphasize the ways in which the Rules are alike.
Pointing to the requirement that all defenses be stated “in short
and plain terms,”161 some courts have determined that this
“short-and-plain” link to Rule 8(a)(2) is alone sufficient to trigger
the “plausibility” requirement that Twombly announced.162 The
applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, wrote one court,
is the “the more reasoned view” and the one supported by “the
text of the Federal Rules” because “[w]hile the language of Rules
8(a) and 8(b) is certainly not identical, those sections contain
important textual overlap with both subsections requiring a
‘short and plain’ statement of the claim or defense.”163
Presumably, for these courts, the obligation to plead a “short and
plain” defense carries with it the same obligation required to
plead
a
“short
and
plain”
claim—namely,
Twiqbal
“plausibility.”164 In other words, the “plausibility” obligation
160. Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011
WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A).
162. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
163. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 112416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011).
164. See Bank of Beaver City v. Sw. Feeders, LLC, No. 4:10CV3209, 2011
WL 4632887, at *6–8 (D. Neb. Oct. 4, 2011) (explaining, but ultimately rejecting,
the “short-and-plain” language similarity argument). See generally Dann v.
Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding no need to
conclusively resolve the Twiqbal debate, but noting that “when an affirmative
defense omits a short and plain statement of facts entirely and fails totally to
allege the necessary elements of the claim, it has not satisfied the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules”).
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ought to be fixed as emanating from the common “short and
plain” requirement (which is found in both Rules 8(a)(2) and
8(b)), and not from the distinctive “showing”/“entitlement to
relief” requirement (which is found in Rule 8(a)(2) only).165
Although this contention is certainly not bereft of logic (i.e., what
does it mean to allege “plainly”?), it is difficult to square with the
Supreme Court’s apparent and repeated reliance in Twombly on
the “showing”/“entitlement to relief” language in Rule 8(a)(2).166
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
166. This is not to say, however, that none have tried to square that view
with Twombly. Professor Joseph A. Seiner has recently offered a thoughtful
defense of this view. Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 987 (2012). For him, and even granting that “the Court
certainly discussed the terminology of Rule 8(a),” Twombly and its reasoning
hinged less on the syntax of Rule 8(a)(2) and more on practical considerations of
discovery costs and the fairness of notice to adversaries. Id. at 1004. Professor
Seiner correctly notes that the nation’s courts have long and often applied Rule
12(b)(6) standards in testing Rule 12(f) motions to strike. See id. at 1004–05
(“[M]any courts have treated a Rule 12(f) motion to strike an affirmative defense
under a standard similar to that of a motion to dismiss a complaint.”). Mindful
of that body of case law, and the Twombly Court’s emphatic rejection that it was
installing a “heightened fact pleading” regime, Professor Seiner favors a unitary
view of Twiqbal’s application: “To abruptly change course in light of Twombly—
and suddenly rely on the subtle distinctions in the language between the two
rules, as many courts have done—seems inconsistent with prior precedent and
the Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 1006 (footnotes omitted). Professor Seiner
may well be right: refusing to embrace a unitary application of federal pleading
standards may seem precedentially inconsistent. It is hard, however, to read the
Twombly Court’s repeated emphasis on Rule 8(a)(2)’s syntax otherwise. See, e.g.,
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” (emphasis added)); id. (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level” (emphasis added)); id. at 555 n.3
(“While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome
requirement that a claimant ‘set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim,’ Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.” (emphasis added in part) (citation omitted)); id. (“Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the
claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” (emphasis added)); id. at 557
(“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely
consistent with) [an antitrust] agreement reflects the threshold requirement of
Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough helft to ‘sho[w] that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (emphasis added)); id. (“An allegation of parallel
conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint; it
gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual
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More interestingly still, both sides in this debate claim that
the Official Forms support their construction. Because the Rules
were first introduced into federal practice in 1938, the Official
Forms have played a prominent illustrative role.167 Rule 84
verifies that “[t]he forms in the Appendix suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules
contemplate.”168
Official Form 30 depicts an “Answer Presenting Defenses
Under Rule 12(b).”169 Courts holding that Twiqbal is not
applicable to affirmative defenses often cite Paragraphs 4 and 6
of this form, which conclusorily and in “bare bones” fashion
announce: “4. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” and “6. The plaintiff’s claim is barred by
the statute of limitations because it arose more than ___ years
before this action was commenced.”170 That is the official
illustration of the “simplicity and brevity” Rule 8(c) requires.171
From this unadorned austerity, those Twiqbal-rejecting courts
draw confirmation of their view: “the undetailed recitations of
affirmative defenses illustrated in Form 30 show . . . [that the
Rule 8(c)(1) requirement] is not an exacting standard even
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitle[ment] to relief.’” (emphasis added)); id. at 569 n.14 (“Here, our concern is
not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently ‘particular[ized];’
rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render
plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.” (emphasis added in part) (citation
omitted)); id. at 558 (“So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true,
could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should . . .
be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the
parties and the court.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. at 570 (“[W]e do
not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” (emphasis added)).
167. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J.
177, 181 (1958)
We do not require detail. We require a general statement. How much?
Well, the answer is made in what I think is probably the most
important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned,
namely, the Forms. These are important because when you can’t define
you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning.
168. Form 30, FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms.
169. Form 30 ¶¶ 4, 6, FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms.
170. Id.
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
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remotely approaching the type of notice required of a claim under
Twombly and Iqbal.”172 If factual detail and specification were
required, Official Form 30 would be violating the Rules—
something Rule 84 confirms is not the case.
Yet, courts abiding by the view that Twiqbal applies to the
pleading of affirmative defenses draw precisely the opposite
message from Official Form 30. They rely not on sample
Paragraph 4 (failure to state a claim) but on sample Paragraph 6
(statute of limitations), and emphasize how that sample supplies
additional language that seems to enhance the otherwise bald
time-bar allegation:
Form 30 . . . strongly suggests that bare-bones assertions of at
least some affirmative defenses will not suffice, as the Form’s
illustration of a statute of limitations’ defense sets forth not
only the name of the affirmative defense, but also facts in
support of it [namely, that “it arose more than __ years before
this action was commenced”]. Given Rule 84’s focus on
illustrating “the simplicity and brevity that these rules
contemplate,” the additional factual detail contained in Form
30 is hardly superfluous.173

Not so, reason the Twiqbal-rejecting courts. They find such
an interpretation of Official Form 30 belied by the distinction
between facts and legal conclusions:
The reference to a number of years has been interpreted by
some courts as an elaboration of “facts” in support of the
172. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa.
2011). Accord Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15
(D. Utah Apr. 19, 2012) (“The fact that a simple statement that a complaint
‘fails to state a claim’ is sufficient to plead an affirmative defense under the
federal rules, even in the absence of additional factual allegations, suggests that
the heightened Twombly/Iqbal standard was not intended to be extended to
affirmative defenses.”); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D.
Kan. 2011) (quoting the same “fails to state a claim” allegation in the Official
Form, and concluding “the brief and simple nature of this language indicates
that no more detail is required of a defendant in an answer”); Lane v. Page, 272
F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (noting that “[t]he forms appended to the rules
bolster the Court’s analysis that rule 8(b) does not require defendants to provide
factual allegations supporting defendants” because “Form 30 provides no factual
allegations in support of the defense, and form 30 is sufficient under the rules”).
173. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011
WL 5118325, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011).
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defense. This is patently not the case. The language of the
Form suggests stating that the action “arose more than __
years” before the case was commenced. The use of “more than”
does not call for the pleader to state when the action factually
arose; it only calls for the pleader to state the relevant
limitations period governing the plaintiff’s claim. This is a
legal conclusion, which is, again, insufficient under
Twombly/Iqbal . . . . That both defenses listed in Form 30
would be laughed out of court under Twombly/Iqbal impresses
strongly against extracting the principles from those cases and
applying them in the different context of affirmative
defenses.174

So, is there a “plain meaning” of Rule 8 and its subparts that
answers the question of Twiqbal’s applicability to affirmative
defenses? Both sides in the debate, fascinatingly, say yes. But
that “yes” means a polar opposite conclusion for each.
C. The Policy Argument Debate
In her Weddle ruling, Judge Sammartino next considered the
various functional considerations of applying, or refusing to
apply, Twiqbal to affirmative defenses. Of course, as noted above,
the analysis never reaches this level of inquiry (for anything
other than mere collateral corroboration) if a court determines
that the “plain language” of the Federal Rules is clear on the
point.175 In either event, whether as core support for an “un174. EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 664 (M.D. Ala. July 9, 2012)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
175. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text (discussing plain
meaning construction of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Joe Ryan
Enters., 281 F.R.D. at 663 (“[S]uch policy considerations are foreclosed when the
language of the Rule is clear. The judiciary is commissioned to interpret the
Rules as they are written, not to re-draft them when it may be convenient.”
(citation omitted)); Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 566 (S.D. Cal.
2012) (“Applying the same standard of pleading to claims and affirmative
defenses, despite this clear distinction in the rules’ language, would run counter
to the Supreme Court’s warning in Twombly that legislative action, not ‘judicial
interpretation,’ is necessary to ‘broaden the scope’ of specific federal pleading
standards.”); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC),
2011 WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“[P]olicy considerations may be
compelling, but whether this Court agrees with them or not, it is first bound to
apply the relevant rules of civil procedure as written.”).
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plain” Rule text or as passing corroboration for a dictated
conclusion, Judge Sammartino identified three such policy
considerations in refusing Twiqbal’s applicability to the Weddle
defenses: “the limited time a defendant has to prepare an answer
to the complaint, avoidance of the need to repeatedly amend an
answer to assert later-discovered defenses, and discouragement
of motions to strike brought for dilatory or harassment
purposes.”176
Those considerations are often cited by other courts in their
own opinions rejecting Twiqbal for affirmative defenses, but the
list of relevant functional concerns does not end with these three.
Over time, many other considerations have been offered as
counseling against the application of Twiqbal to affirmative
defenses:
1) Defendant’s Time to Plead: While plaintiffs may
possess a lengthy prepleading period for fact-gathering
and legal research (bounded by the applicable statute
of limitations), defendants ordinarily receive just
twenty-one days to prepare and file their answer and
affirmative defenses;
2) Defendant’s Lack of Knowledge: Given this brief time
frame, and the fact that the defendant may be seeing
and reacting to the allegations of the plaintiff’s
pleading for the first time, it is unrealistic to expect a
defendant to learn the facts necessary to confirm
“plausibility” in those twenty-one days;
3) Waiver Risk: This diminished preparation time is
exacerbated by the command that potentially casecritical affirmative defenses be expressly (and
appropriately) pleaded, or be deemed waived forever;
4) No Counterpleading Obligation: In part, the
“plausibility” detail required from plaintiffs is intended
to facilitate the requirement imposed on defendants to
counterplead, paragraph by paragraph, to the
complaint’s allegations; in contrast, plaintiffs
ordinarily need not (and, most often, may not)
counterplead to the answer;

176. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
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5) Ease of Fleshing Out Missing Details: Because
affirmative defenses are necessarily directed against
the plaintiffs’ claim, much of the factual support for
those defenses will already be known to the plaintiffs,
and what information they lack can readily be
obtained through simple contention interrogatories;
6) Judicial Intervention is Unnecessary: In typical cases,
nonviable affirmative defenses do not require court
culling; instead, their nonviability becomes quickly
apparent and they are, thereafter, simply ignored by
both litigants—thus, ratcheting up the defense-culling
standard will add nothing but cost and delay to federal
litigation;
7) Goal of Ending Litigation Not Present: Holding
complaints to the Twiqbal standard can permit the
termination of federal litigation; conversely, striking
an affirmative defense will rarely have that effect as
the plaintiff’s claim will still continue on;
8) Goal of Expediting Litigation Not Present: Were an
affirmative defense stricken, it often will be without
prejudice, to be replaced by a substituted averment in
an revised answer; in such instances, the litigation is
thereby retarded, not expedited;
9) Goal of Avoiding Discovery Not Present: The plaintiff
will have already opened the doors to federal civil
discovery by filing the complaint, so the Twiqbal
objective of endeavoring to avoid the opening of
discovery will not be implicated;
10) Goal of Disincentivising Extortionate Settlements Not
Present: Baseless, implausible claims inject the risk of
extorting settlements from nonculpable defendants
who are forced into settling simply by the desire of
avoiding prolonged, expensive, and disruptive
discovery; a pending (though baseless and implausible)
affirmative defense is unlikely to exert similar
extortionate pressure;
11) More Motions to Strike are Disfavored: Applying
Twiqbal to affirmative defenses would invite the filing
of more Rule 12(f) motions to strike, a result that
competes with the long-held conventional view that
motions to strike are disfavored time-wasters, to be
granted only with great reserve; and
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12) Plaintiff Protections Remain: Plaintiffs are not
unprotected against frivolous affirmative defenses,
since defendants have initial disclosure obligations for
their defenses, and Rule 11’s mandate of veracity in
pleading constrains wholly unfounded averments.177

The court in Weddle mentioned functional considerations like
these to validate the holding that Twiqbal does not apply to
affirmative defenses. Courts that have ruled differently—finding
that affirmative defenses must satisfy the Twiqbal “plausibility”
test—have likewise supported their conclusions with functional
considerations, including:
1) Nonsensical Disparate Standards: Either as judicial
policy or as an implement in the administration of
justice, it makes no good sense to erect a national
federal standard that sets one pleading norm for
claimants and a different norm for defendants;
2) Pleader Equality: Requiring Twiqbal “plausibility”
makes success in pleading a degree more difficult, and
if such an enhanced pleading obligation is to be foisted
upon claimants, defendants, too, should have to labor
under the same weight (after all, “what’s sauce for the
goose . . . ”);
3) As a Broad Pleading Principle, Pleaders Should Make
Only “Plausible” Averments, Not Possible Ones:
Mindful of Twiqbal, the goal of all federal pleading
ought to be to impart enough notice to an opponent
and the court of some “plausible,” factual foundation
177. See, e.g., EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR , 2012 WL
3242168, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (discussing functional considerations
militating against applying Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Floridia v. DLT 3
Girls, Inc., Civ. No. 4:11–cv–3624 ,2012 WL 1565533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2,
2012) (same); Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11–CV–95–PRC,
2012 WL 266968, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012) (same); Bayer CropScience
AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, Civ. No. 10–1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557, at
*1–*2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (same); Bennett v. Sprint Nextl Corp., No. 09–
2122–EFM, 2011 WL 4553055, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) (same);
Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011 WL 3803668, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (same); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1257
(D. Kan. 2011) (same); Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893,
899–902 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (same); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 595–97 (D.N.M.
2011) (same); Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of Johnston, LLC,
752 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725–26 (W.D. Va. 2010) (same).
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for every pleaded assertion, and not merely a
suggestion of an issue that may possibly apply in the
litigation;
4) “Plausible” Pleading Is Not That Hard: Importing
Twiqbal should not radically alter how responding
parties plead affirmative defenses; as with complaints,
detailed, evidentiary pleading of facts will not be
required, but instead only “enough” to “raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence”178 to prove the allegations;
5) “Plausibility” Cost Savings: One of the objects of
“plausibility” in pleading is to cull from the dockets
(and from the workload of all parties and the judicial
system) the task of litigating issues for which no
threshold factual foundation exists; by holding
affirmative defenses to the same “plausibility”
standard, both the court and the parties are saved the
costs and labor of discovering and sorting through
affirmative defenses that lack factual foundation;
6) Same “Plausibility” Discovery Trigger on Defense
Issues: Another object of “plausibility” pleading is to
avoid embarking on unnecessary discovery; that goal is
similarly achieved in the affirmative defense context,
by shutting the door to potentially expensive discovery
on affirmative defense issues until the “plausibility”
line is first nudged passed; and
7) Waiver Risk Can Be Minimized: If the defendant is
unable to plead a not-yet-“plausible” affirmative
defense, the defendant can seek (and should liberally
receive) leave to amend to add the defense following
the uncovering of its factual foundation in discovery.179
178. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
179. See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–00481–RCJ–
VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00854–
RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 607539, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) (discussing functional
considerations militating in favor of applying Twiqbal to affirmative defenses);
Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational, Inc., No. 5:11–CV–00135–R, 2011
WL 5525938, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (same); Aguilar v. City Lights of
China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *2–3 (D. Md. Oct.
24, 2011) (same); Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 4:10–cv–00582–DGK, 2011
WL 1364075, at *1–2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011) (same); Dann v. Lincoln Nat’l
Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2011) (same); Nixson v. Health
Alliance, No. 1:10–CV–00338, 2010 WL 5230867, at *2 (S.D. Ohio. Dec. 16,
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Scholars, likewise, have taken opposite positions in this
debate, some disfavoring the view that Twiqbal ought to apply to
affirmative defenses, and some embracing that construction.180
V. National Incoherence and the Practitioner’s Dilemma
In drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the
treasured aspirations of Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland,
and their 1938 drafting compatriots was to establish of a uniform
set of federal procedural standards that would become the settled
practice rubric governing litigation in every federal court, be it
Dallas, Detroit, Danbury, or Del Rey.181 While Clark and
Sunderland tilt to no one in the magnificence of their
achievement, the Federal Rules have never quite achieved that
vision of true uniformity. The nationally divided precedent
addressing Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses is just
another chapter in that tale.
2010) (same); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649–52 (D. Kan.
Dec 22, 2009) (same). The court in Oleksy v. General Electric Co., No. 06-C01245, 2013 WL 3233259 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013), made its point with great
emphasis in a recent patent dispute, noting how the defendant had raised “prior
use” as both an affirmative defense and as a declaratory judgment counterclaim.
The court reasoned, that it were to adopt the view that Twiqbal does not apply
to affirmative defenses, “it would then be required to review the same factual
allegations under two different standards and could potentially reach a result
where it found the affirmative defenses were sufficiently pled but the
counterclaim was not despite the fact they relied on the exact same factual
allegations.” Id. at *17.
180. Compare, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1360 (2010) (“[O]n both the doctrinal and the
purposive level, Twombly-Iqbal applies only to claimants. The backup test of
notice pleading instead applies to defendant’s pleadings, as it does everywhere
else.” (citations omitted)), with Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the
Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1003–04 (2012) (“In the end, however,
this [Twiqbal-inapplicable] reading should fail in favor of a much broader
interpretation of these decisions and the Federal Rules. This broader reading
would apply the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal to all
pleadings, including the affirmative defense.”).
181. See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938–1958:
Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 451 (1958)
(expressing hope in “the real ideal of a uniform and natural procedure for
courts”).
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There is, today, a majority approach followed by more than
sixty-seven percent of the federal judges who have ruled squarely
on the issue (Twiqbal does not apply to affirmative defenses), but
that somehow feels like cold comfort.182 The “majority approach”
of a few years ago (at least as many district courts understood
that “majority approach”) favored just the opposite view, the now
minority view still retains a strong foothold, and the non-Twiqbal
“factual notice” variant has done little to add stability and
predictability into the affirmative defense pleading question.183 It
is also weak solace for litigators and their clients when the
interpretation of Rule 8(c)—and its very serious ramifications in
actual litigation contexts—continues to vary not from circuit to
circuit but from courtroom to courtroom. Although the lower
federal judiciary is understandably awash in the uncertainty
following the Supreme Court’s unveiling of “plausibility” pleading
in Twombly and Iqbal, the fact that the courts are construing the
very same textual language and still reaching entirely different
interpretations of the same Rule offers little reassurance to those
who must toil in the federal halls of justice. The result, for the
bench, the bar, and scholars alike, inspires a shake of the head,
not the awe of admiration.
Much suffers under the current state of things. Certainly,
clients (for example, J & J Sports Productions, Inc.) are numbed
into derision by the comical inconsistency among what advertises
itself to be a unified court system. Practitioners are resigned to
the conclusion that while many aspects of federal practice are
normalized, a great many others are not, and that Dean Clark’s
hopeful vision of the genuine transportability of federal expertise
from one district to another is often illusory. Jurists are
condemned to an existence of unguided, island-like independence
in which they are free not only to depart from the logic and
reasoning of a distant colleague, but also from that of their lunch
partner a chambers away down the hall. This may be judicial
“percolation,” but it has little else to commend it.

182. See infra Appendix of Cases (discussing relevant case law).
183. See supra Part IV (recounting evolution in judicial views); see also infra
Appendix of Cases (discussing relevant case law).
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What Are Litigants To Do?
Until this national incoherence is finally and conclusively
resolved by an authoritatively precedential ruling or Rule
amendment, there seem to be three obvious options: plead
affirmative defenses in the traditional manner, attempt to plead
“plausible” affirmative defenses, or postpone pleading all
affirmative defenses and seek leave to amend later. None offers a
very satisfying choice.
Option 1: Plead Traditionally
The first option is for the litigants to plead affirmative
defenses as they always had. Preliminarily, it is noteworthy that
this option still would not fully resolve the national incoherence
on the proper pleading of affirmative defenses. Even historically,
in the pre-Twiqbal environment, national uniformity was absent
on the issue, but the disparity that existed (wide as it sometimes
was) seemed limited largely to circuit-to-circuit differences.184
This option likely supposes that the litigants (in courtrooms
of first impression) propose to stand their ground and advocate
against the importing of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses. The
growing majority trend disfavoring Twiqbal’s importation
certainly helps that cause, as does the strength of many of the
Twiqbal-rejecting arguments. There is an indisputable textual
difference between the pleading Rule for claims (Rule 8(a)(2)) and
the pleading Rule for defenses and affirmative defenses (Rules
8(b) and 8(c)).185 It seems plain that the Supreme Court relied
heavily, at least in part, on the syntax of the claims-pleading
184. Compare Shechter v. Comptroller of New York, 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d
Cir. 1996) (finding that bald assertions of affirmative defenses are improper),
with Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 Fed. Appx. 442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006) (approving the
pleading of affirmative defenses in “general terms” as long as they afford “fair
notice of the nature of the defense”), and Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354,
362 (5th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that, “in some cases, merely pleading the
name of the affirmative defense . . . may be sufficient,” but “baldly ‘naming’ the
broad affirmative defenses of ‘accord and satisfaction’ and ‘waiver and/or
release’ falls well short of the minimum particulars needed to identify the
affirmative defense in question”).
185. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (noting the differences
between Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(c)).
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Rule in setting out the “plausibility” standard in Twombly.186 The
interpretative jousting over the implications of Official Form 30
inclines toward the Twiqbal-rejecting view.187 In weighing the
functional considerations, the Twiqbal-rejecting view has
formidable strength: claimants frequently enjoy a prepleading
investigation period measured in years, whereas defending
parties are limited typically to just twenty-one days;188 thus time
constrained, defending parties must nonetheless timely and
properly raise the defense or risk losing it;189 defending parties
have a Rule 8 need for factual clarity to counterplead to a
complaint, whereas claiming parties are usually barred from ever
counterpleading to an answer;190 dismissing an unmeritorious
claim ordinarily terminates the litigation, whereas striking a
defense will rarely (if ever) have that effect, or even the
advantage of materially shortening the case;191 the presence of an
186. See supra notes 85–91, 166 and accompanying text (discussing
Twombly).
187. See supra notes 167–74 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of the official forms on the debate).
188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (stating that answers must be filed
within 21 days after service, but will be extended to 60 days if formal service is
properly waived or to 90 days if sent outside the United States). See generally
Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011)
Plaintiffs can prepare their complaints over years, limited only by the
statute of limitations, whereas defendants have only twenty-one days to
file their answers. . . . Because a plaintiff can do a lot of pre-filing work,
and a defendant generally cannot, there is a sound rationale for
requiring more of plaintiffs than of defendants at the pleading stage.
189. See EEOC v. LHC Grp. Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR, 2012 WL
3242168, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (“[T]he federal rules require defendants
to assert any affirmative defense that may be applicable. Accordingly,
defendants must assert defenses out of an abundance of caution to avoid the
argument that meritorious defenses should later be considered waived.”
(citation omitted)).
190. See Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 596 (“Whereas a defendant is deemed to admit
the allegations in a complaint if he or she does not respond, a plaintiff may
largely ignore an answer without formal legal consequence.”); Tyco Fire Prods.
LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[W]hile there is a
need for a more factual understanding of a claim as to permit the formulation of
a response, a party served with an affirmative defense is generally not required
or permitted to file any responsive pleading at all.”).
191. See Floridia v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., Civ. No. 4:11–cv–3624, 2012 WL
1565533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2012) (“[W]hile a motion to dismiss can resolve
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unmeritorious claim may induce an unwarranted settlement,
whereas the presence of an unmeritorious affirmative defense is
unlikely to have that effect;192 and the discovery floodgates are
probably already opening by the time the answer is filed.193
However one handicaps the strength of these textual and
functional arguments, a litigant still confronts the severe
consequences of misjudgment. The litigant may guess wrong, may
misread the trial judge’s inclinations, or may fail to persuade the
trial judge of the soundness of the Twiqbal-rejecting approach
(who would then join the nearly thirty-three percent of the ruling
judges who now insist upon only “plausible” affirmative defenses
in their courtrooms). In such a case, the litigant may be left with
an inadequately pleaded affirmative defense, soon to be stricken,
a case, thereby avoiding discovery entirely, motions to strike only prolong
prediscovery motion practice; as such, raising the standard for pleading
affirmative defenses would only encourage more motions to strike.”(citation
omitted)); Bennett v. Sprint Nextl Corp., No. 09–2122–EFM, 2011 WL 4553055,
at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) (“[B]ecause the remedy for striking defenses at
this stage of the litigation is often to allow amendment, applying the plausibility
standard here would likely have little to no positive impact on the progression of
the litigation.”).
192. See Bennett, 2011 WL 4553055, at *2 (“[I]t is unlikely that the prospect
of having to engage in discovery related to a defense that the plaintiff believes to
be baseless will motivate the plaintiff to settle their claim instead of fighting the
defense they think is without merit.”).
193. See Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15
(D. Utah Apr. 19, 2012)
[I]t is plaintiffs’ submission of their initial complaint that invokes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the first instance. The primary
function of imposing a pleading standard on a plaintiff in the first
instance is to ensure that ‘largely groundless claims’ are not made to
‘take up the time of a number of other people. Affirmative defenses, on
the other hand,,]do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court and screening
them for efficiency purposes is not vital.
(citations omitted); Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011
WL 3803668, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011)
[W]hile an insufficiently plead complaint may unfairly subject a
defendant to expensive and time-consuming discovery, the converse is
not true with regard to affirmative defenses, in that a plaintiff may
easily explore a defendant’s affirmative defenses through contention
interrogatories and other discovery. And, of course, a plaintiff who
initiates litigation is less likely to be heard to lament the initiation of
discovery in any event.
(citation omitted).
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thereby confronting the very defense waiver the litigant must
avoid. This first option, then, carries grave risks.
Option 2: Plead “Plausibly”
The second option is to assume that the Twiqbal
“plausibility” standard will govern the pleading of affirmative
defenses, and then endeavor to meet that standard. Indeed, that
is what the defendants in the Weddle case appeared to be
attempting with their enhanced pleading of the first and second
affirmative defenses.194 Originally, they had alleged both their
standing and innocent infringer defenses in bare bones,
conclusory fashion, but then seemed readily able to revise those
averments by supplying clarifying factual details.195 It is difficult
to deny that the revised affirmative defenses impart better notice
to Mr. Weddle than the original versions.196 To some
commentators, this is among the most salutary disciplining
functions that the very threat of Twiqbal serves.197 It prompts
pleaders to add clarity. And sometimes, as the defendants in
Weddle demonstrated, that factually enhanced pleading option is
easily discharged. But only sometimes.
In the other instances, where the defending litigants are, on
the heels of the complaint’s arrival, just learning about the
dispute for the first time, and then must meet a blisteringly quick
turnaround obligation, the “plausibility” command is an

194. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (discussing the amended
answer).
195. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text (comparing the original
and the amended answer).
196. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (comparing the original
and amended answers).
197. See James M. Beck, More Twiqbal Scholarship, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW
BLOG (May 10, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/
2011/05/more-twiqbal-scholarship.html
[W]e think there’s more to TwIqbal than meets the eye—because we
think that plaintiffs have themselves responded to TwIqbal by pleading
more thoroughly than they used to. . . . In most cases plaintiffs can plead
better . . . . That’s one thing that TwIqbal is changing, whether or not a
successful motion to dismiss results.
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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“untenable” one.198 For many litigants, this quick turnaround
obligation may prove to be far less than twenty-one days; unless
the served parties have counsel on-site or just around the block,
and move swiftly to (a) appreciate the nature of the document
served upon them, (b) forward the papers instantly to their
counsel, and (c) rapidly assemble the personnel necessary to
make factual sense of the allegations, it may be days or weeks
before the litigants’ attorneys even can begin to strategize
through the available affirmative defense permutations. That the
litigants in this posture simultaneously confront the risk of
waiver only makes the “untenable” situation worse. As one court
concluded: “[A]pplying the concept of notice to require more than
awareness of the issue’s existence imposes an unreasonable
burden on defendants who risk the prospect of waiving a defense
at trial by failing to plead it, and have a short amount of time to
develop the facts necessary to do so.”199 This second option, then,
may sometimes be a manageable one, but other times will prove
catastrophic.
Option 3: Plead Later
The third option would reconfigure the pleading norms for
affirmative defenses entirely. Fearing waiver by pleading un“plausibly,” but lacking both the time and the information to
formulate “plausible” affirmative defenses, the defending
litigants could decide to plead no affirmative defenses at all.
Instead, they could pursue post-answer informal investigation
and formal discovery, and upon marshaling all their affirmative
defenses—now replete with “plausible” detail—they could seek at
that later time leave (from their opponents or the court) to amend
their answer to insert the new allegations.

198. See Michaud v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., Civ. No. 11–cv–01015–RPM–
MEH, 2011 WL 2885952, at *4 (D. Colo. July 18, 2011) (“[I]t is untenable to
require a defendant to plead an affirmative defense with the same level of
thoroughness required to state a claim for relief, considering the limited time
frame to produce an answer.”).
199. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (citations omitted).
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The Rules certainly allow for post-answer amendments, and
the standard for granting them professes liberality.200
Commentators note that the prospect for such amendments could
potentially cure the challenges that may arise from imposing the
“plausibility” standard on affirmative defenses.201 Alas,
uncertainties abound.
Such amendments are permitted only through the
beneficence of one’s opponent or the tolerance of the presiding
judge. Prudent counsel would probably not rely on either, at least
not as a prospective matter. Help from an adversary may be
offered graciously, but contentious litigation settings create
unpredictable behavioral dynamics such that opponent generosity
would seem a dangerous thing to count on. Help from the court
should come “liberally,” but here, too, circumstances intervene.
Courts set schedules, press deadlines, and move dockets. Late
amendments threaten all of these. Were a defending party to opt
for this third option as a way to meet a “plausible” pleading
standard for affirmative defenses, the presiding court would have
to countenance routine post-answer amendments and their
potential (likely?) incumbent risk of dooming the established case
time-schedule. Even the commentators who see post-answer
amendments as the antidote to “plausibility” complications
impliedly acknowledge the uncertainty that delay injects.202
200. Rule 15 provides that, following a very brief, early period of amendment
as of right, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
201. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1274, at 314 (Supp. 2012) (“Given that the defendant may
amend the answer to assert an omitted affirmative defense on the written
consent of the adverse party or by leave of the district court, imposition of the
plausibility standard is not overly burdensome. The defendant may state a
plausible defense after facts become available.” (footnotes omitted)).
202. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1271, at 607 (2004)
[T]he liberal amendment of pleadings philosophy expressed in Rule 15 can
be used by the parties and the district court to correct a failure to plead
affirmatively when the omission is brought to light. A degree of diligence
on the part of counsel is desirable in this regard so as to minimize any
possibility of prejudice to the opposing party.
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, it is not altogether clear that the federal discovery
procedures would even tolerate this maneuver as a canon of
normal practice. The available scope of discovery under those
procedures is, in most instances, defined by relevancy “to any
party’s claim or defense.”203 In the case of suspected—but
unpleaded—affirmative defenses, one could readily understand
the fear that meaningful discovery into those potential defenses
would meet with scope objections and be successfully resisted.
This third option, then, is as treacherous as the first two.
Which Option? The Diabolical Choice
Among the defending litigants’ three options for asserting
their affirmative defenses, none is safe and all are uncertain. The
first risks waiver from the inadequacy of the pleaded affirmative
defense. The second risks waiver from lacking the factual
predicates to plead the affirmative defense adequately, and then
having the resulting effort stricken as insufficient. The third
risks waiver from postponing the pleading of affirmative
defenses, and being later denied the chance for pre-pleading
discovery or post-discovery amendment. Thus exists the
unresolved question of Twiqbal applicability to affirmative
defenses—the world in which J & J Sports Productions, Inc.
found itself navigating for seventeen months in three
jurisdictions.204
What is the “right” answer to this nagging uncertainty,
which bedevils the current practice of defensive pleading in the
federal courts? From a cloistered perch in legal academia, all
manner of opinions on that question can be volunteered—and
each of them is likely to be grounded in some reason and logic. To
my mind, Judge Sammartino and her colleagues in the emerging
majority have the better of the argument. As she noted in her
Weddle opinion, the language difference between Rule 8(a)(2) and
Rule 8(c) is neither incidental or inconsequential.205 It is difficult
to read Twombly as grounding the “plausibility” requirement in
something other than the “show”/“entitlement to relief” language
203.
204.
205.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
See supra Part II (outlining the J & J litigation).
Supra Part III.

THE ODD STATE OF TWIQBAL PLAUSIBILITY

1631

embodied in Rule 8(a)(2).206 Because that very language is
missing from Rule 8(c), a fair interpretation of the “plausibility”
requirement (at least as it has emanated from Twombly) would
seem to foreclose its applicability to affirmative defenses. This
would not seem to lie within the fair ambit of broad judicial
discretion; rather, it seems to be the only sound interpretation of
Twombly’s analysis and associated logic. Under the “plain
reading” standard for Rule construction (engrafted from
longstanding statutory construction principles), that likely ends
the analysis.207
Judge Sammartino continued, however, to examine the
underlying functional policies to (seemingly) validate her
conclusion. Although that excursion is perhaps unnecessary, it is
difficult to quarrel with her inclinations and those of her likeminded colleagues among the federal district courts. Plaintiffs
often do enjoy a longer pre-pleading investigation period (perhaps
nearly as long as the full duration of the applicable limitations
period), whereas defending parties are limited to only twenty-one
days in most cases for their counterpleading.208 Holding claiming
parties to a higher standard of pleading specificity than
defending parties aligns with the obligation of defending parties
to counterplead in response (something very infrequently
expected—or even tolerated—of claiming parties).209 Plaintiffs are
likely to have a greater command of the factual predicates
to understand most defenses, whereas defending parties may be
learning, for the first time, of the incident giving rise to the
lawsuit with the service of the complaint, with very little time to
accomplish a great deal of pre-pleading investigation.210 The
specter of claim-based extortionate settlements would seem
meaningfully less pronounced with affirmative defenses: it seems
unlikely that any plaintiff is going to be frightened into an
206. Supra notes 166 and accompanying text.
207. Supra notes 97, 122–25 and accompanying text.
208. Supra notes 188, 200 and accompanying text.
209. Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting that the plaintiff
often has far more time to investigate prior to filing a complaint than the
defendant will have in the days between receiving the complaint and filing a
response).
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unmerited settlement by the presence of a conclusorily pleaded
affirmative defense.211 And defending parties face the numbing
risk of waiver from unpleaded affirmative defenses.212 It would be
desirable (and helpful) if defending parties could, and indeed did,
plead with more factual precision in their affirmative defenses.
But that is not what the terms of Rule 8(c) require, nor what the
practical realities of defensive pleading often allow.
Perhaps, though, the “right” answer to resolving this Twiqbal
interpretative uncertainty needs to be appreciated at a much
more practical level. At some point, it might not matter what the
“right” interpretation of Rule 8(c) is quite as much as it matters
what the “wrong” interpretation is. The transcending problem
today is that there is no uniform national answer (and, indeed,
not even a reliable regional answer, circuit answer, or district
answer) to this question. For a unified federal judiciary, that is a
serious defect and, given the enormous ramifications of
inadequate affirmative defense pleading, a potentially calamitous
one. So, perhaps it is most precise to say simply that the “right”
interpretation of Rule 8(c) is the one that everyone is obliged to
follow as a uniform national approach, with accompanying
procedural safeguards installed to ensure that justice is done.213
Of course, this national debate on the proper interpretation
of Rule 8(c) could be readily abated by amending the federal
rules, but here, too, many of these same concerns would confound
that process. Perhaps the drafters could revise Rule 15 to make
explicit that defending parties are entitled to proceed through
discovery (or at least a fair measure of it) with unpleaded
affirmative defenses, and then have a clear Rule-based assurance
of their right to add factually “plausible” affirmative defenses
211. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the differing risks
attached to different types of conclusory pleadings).
212. Supra notes 189, 199 and accompanying text.
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”). Thus, for example, there might be an express national
rejection of “plausibility” for pleading affirmative defenses, either by the
Supreme Court or through rulemaking, or alternatively, the unfortunate but
necessary acceptance of a broad period for permissive amendments to Rule 8(c)
answers to accommodate post-discovery affirmative defense additions.
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later by amendment. This seems an unlikely solution. It would
require a meaningful broadening of the scope of authorized
federal discovery,214 and it could send the process of trial
scheduling spiraling into the realm of constant uncertainty as
claiming parties, who now confront entirely new, belatedly added
affirmative defenses, insist on equal time to explore those
additions and to endeavor to marshal the evidence necessary to
meet those new defenses at trial. No Rules revision fix is likely to
be entirely satisfying.
In the meanwhile, what is the cautious practitioner to do?
There is, of course, the rare possibility that the particular judge
before whom the litigant will be appearing has already taken
sides in this debate. Readers are reminded how this Article’s
national survey verified that views on this issue differ at the
highly-local, chambers-by-chambers level. Nevertheless, a perfect
match is certainly not out of the question. To aid in that search,
the Appendix of Cases that now concludes this Article endeavors
to provide a comprehensive cataloguing of the Nation’s district
court decisions on the Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses issue since
the Iqbal decision was released in May 2009 through September
15, 2013. In the end, that is the only nearly215 reliable option
available to defending parties as they labor over how to plead.
Unsatisfying to be sure, but it is the odd state of Twiqbal
“plausibility” in pleading affirmative defenses.

214. Federal civil litigants are now permitted, as a usual matter, to discover
“any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Because a contemplated but as yet unpleaded affirmative
defense would not qualify as “any party’s claim or defense,” discovery pursuing
it would likely be objectionable unless Rule 26(b)(1) were revised to expressly
tolerate discovery on such possible but un-alleged defenses.
215. A district judge is likely always free, upon considerations of new
briefing or more recent developments and trends in the law, to depart from an
earlier position on how Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses ought to be pleaded. See,
e.g., Polo v. Shwiff, No. C-12-04461-JSW, 2013 WL 1797671, at *4–*5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 29, 2013) (noting the Court’s own original rejection of Twiqbal for
affirmative defenses, but now, “[a]fter careful consideration, the Court has been
persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that apply Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses, and it shall evaluate the sufficiency of Defendants’
affirmative defenses under that standard.”).
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VI. Conclusion

The majority view held by the Nation’s district courts that
have considered the question join Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp. in
concluding that Twiqbal “plausibility” does not apply to the
pleading of affirmative defenses. Some among that majority,
however, impose a fact-sensitive interpretation of notice pleading
that seems nonetheless to require a measure of enhanced detail.
The persistent minority view (formerly the majority approach,
just a few years back) holds that Twiqbal applies.
Where does this leave the practitioner? Perhaps Alice B.
Toklas, life-mate to Gertrude Stein and author of two cookbooks,
got it right when she observed, “What’s sauce for the goose may
be sauce for the gander. But it’s not necessarily sauce for the
chicken, the duck, the turkey or the guinea hen.”216 Or perhaps
that’s not exactly quite right. Maybe, as here, whether goose
sauce ought to be seasoned differently than gander sauce depends
on where the kitchen is and on who’s doing the cooking.

216. Obituary, Alice Toklas, 89, Is Dead In Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1967,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/05/03/specials/stein-toklasobit.ht
ml (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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